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**NATO'S GLOBAL ROLE: TO WHAT EXTENT WILL
NATO PURSUE A GLOBAL ORIENTATION?**

by

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March 2004

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GLOBAL ORIENTATION?**

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By analyzing NATO's role and its prevailing tendencies, this thesis contends that NATO is no longer a regional security organization but a collective security instrument with its first front abroad, in the Greater Middle East and Northern Africa. However, if NATO is to contribute profoundly to international peace, it needs an institutional framework with global legitimacy.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

The primary purposes of this thesis are to discuss the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the era of globalization, elucidate tendencies in the international security system, examine rifts prevailing in the transatlantic link, and survey NATO's recent progress and development.

This thesis also analyzes what determines and forces NATO to extend its activities out-of-area. By exploring the emerging threats in the context of recent geopolitical changes, the intention is to stress the fact that an out-of-area agenda is now irrelevant as NATO's recent transformation has assumed a global character. Acquiring the broader security role, NATO must be actively engaged in the security agenda of the international system organized by the United Nations.

B. IMPORTANCE

The future of NATO has been discussed continuously since the end of the Cold War. Is NATO still relevant and needed in today's globalized world when the Soviet threat has vanished? Will NATO be redundant in view of the European Union's security arrangement? Should NATO focus only on the Euro-Atlantic area or expand beyond its traditional boundaries?

The euphoria over the end of the bi-polar world resulted in an across-the-board downsizing of armed forces and reduced military budgets. It seemed that the new international system had nothing to fear any longer.

However, the emergence of new threats, namely terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, forced NATO to redefine its posture and structure. Moreover, new security challenges emphasized the need to transform all elements of the security environment concerning collective defense, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction.

NATO opted to extend its activities beyond the traditional borders. As a matter of fact, NATO's new global role raises several questions that are examined in this thesis as follows:

- What is the nature and scope of the NATO's security role?
- How did the changes in the security environment influence NATO?
- How did the differences in American and European strategies affect NATO's development?
- What is the principle and development of the out-of-area issue?
- What is the impact of recent and current operations to NATO's transformation?
- What is the significance of the NATO Response Force?
- What is the scope of the NATO's future security role?

NATO is a central security pillar of transatlantic security, the guarantor of European stability, a mechanism for American engagement in Europe. The possibilities in the United States and Europe for building international institutions, practices, processes, and relationships are not to be found in many other places around the world because common interests and values are dissimilar and cannot be duplicated. NATO has recently undergone profound changes and transformed itself into an effective "peace-enforcement"¹ organization. It has created the innovative military capability—NATO Response Force and transformed its structure to meet new challenges.

Now, the significance of the Alliance is expanding as a major multi-national security organization. Additionally, the NATO allies are essential donors for international aid and developmental assistance.

For the last 50 years, the NATO's center of gravity has been in Western Europe, but the center of activity is moving east and south. The geostrategic center of interest for the foreseeable future will be the Greater Middle East. There is an emerging concern to NATO's south because Africa is replete with ungoverned spaces that can attract terrorists, radical fundamentalism, WMD, and all kinds of criminality.

¹ Giovanna Bono, *NATO's 'Peace-Enforcement' Tasks and 'Policy Communities': 1990-1999*, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), p. 135.

NATO has become an even more powerful player on the world scene. The threats sustained its unity and provided developed its strategy. Regarding its future role, NATO is more or less identical to the role of the United Nations—“to maintain international peace and security.”² This clearly indicates that NATO and the UN strategies should emerge into one concerted endeavor guaranteeing the sustainable development of the international system.

Successful strategies in the global era require much closer coordination between the economic, military, legal, environmental, and scientific and technological policymaking communities. There are few areas in which cooperation must be promoted as greatly as homeland security. A balanced burden-sharing relationship is an immediate imperative. However, these subjects are beyond the horizon of this thesis.

C. METHODOLOGY AND SUMMARY

In order to elucidate its role in the future, this thesis discusses NATO’s development and issues that affected NATO, such as the changing character of both environment and warfare. This thesis employs a policy options analysis and is based upon a qualitative survey of relevant literature, including primary and secondary sources.

The primary sources are *The North Atlantic Treaty*, *Charter of the United Nations*, NATO’s Strategic Concept of 1991, the *Washington Summit Communiqué*, the *Prague Summit Declaration*, *NATO Handbook* and others like *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, *European Security Strategy*, the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* of 2002 and others related to the topic. The secondary sources include political-military analysis from the Internet and journals. In order to achieve a positivist approach, descriptive and deductive methods are used. The thesis is organized as follows.

Chapter I introduces the purpose and importance of this thesis. Chapter II provides the basic characteristics of the international system and examines the main changes in geopolitics. This also examines the phenomenon of globalization and the

² *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter 1, Article 1, available at: <<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>>, accessed 11 January 2004.

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The chapter reassesses the security environment and describes two major threats: terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Chapter III presents the transatlantic security environment. It illustrates the American and European efforts reflected by the pertinent strategic concepts, which provide indispensable instruments for a stable transatlantic security. This chapter also discusses the different strategies on both sides of the Atlantic that split the Alliance and a current attempt to heal the rift.

Chapter IV analyzes NATO's current role and its security interest. Because of analogical evidence provided in previous chapters, this chapter discusses NATO's objectives of adapting to the new strategic environment and also examines the foundation and development of NATO's out-of-area issue and the current NATO operations. The chapter discusses the reasons for the NATO's reform to accept tasks beyond its area of responsibility in order to meet the new challenges.

Chapter V reveals that NATO is a significant component of the international peace augmented by the Prague Capabilities Commitment. The chapter discussed the NATO Response Force as an innovative military capability to meet threats from global terrorism. Since the character of threats has challenged the United States to act globally, it also forces NATO to assume global responsibilities. Otherwise, without a clear purpose, it may lose its legitimacy and the will to live.

Chapter VI concludes that NATO's agenda shapes security for the better. This fact is hardly invisible in the United Nations' peace agenda. However, the new challenges exist owing to complex environmental, political, military, economic, legal, and social interconnections. The new challenges also mandate a UN transformation that will urgently require peace-enforcing teeth to be relevant in a global age. NATO after acquiring the proper agility will be an appropriate instrument for the UN to organize the future international system.

II. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

A. INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

By exploring the principle of the international system, this chapter describes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) role in the international system. NATO, an international organization of collective defense and security in the Euro-Atlantic region, has played an indispensable role in the international system for decades. According to Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, while first visiting the United States, "NATO remains the world's most effective security coalition. And NATO still delivers security when it is needed, and where it is needed, even in a radically new security environment."³ Since NATO is an effective international organization, Jessica Mathews pointed out in this regard, "international organizations were institutions of, by, and for nation-states."⁴

As the state-nations create the basic construction of the world system, the permanent drama is an interaction among them. For example, Hans Morgenthau proclaims a never-ending struggle for power among states, arising from natural human tendencies to dominate others.⁵ On the other hand, Glen Snyder, while comparing Mearsheimer and Waltz theories asserts:

what drives it is not an appetite for power in the human animal, but a search for security that is forced by the anarchic structure of the international system. When all states have capabilities for doing each other harm, each is driven to amass as much power as it can to be as secure as possible against attack.⁶

Considering security consequences, Waltz implies that "In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as

³ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General speech at the National Defense University, Washington, 29 January 2004, NATO Integrated Data Service, available at: <<http://listserv.cc.kuleuven.ac.be/cgi-bin/wa?A1=ind0401&L=natodata>>.

⁴ Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift," *Foreign Affairs*, (Jan-Feb 1997) vol. 76 no. 1, p. 59.

⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., Chapter 1, p. 4.

⁶ Glenn H. Snyder, "Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security," *International Security*, Vol. 27, No.1 (Summer 2002), p 151.

tranquillity, profit and power. The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system.”⁷

It is premature to consider the nation-states as major actors that are excluded from the global scene. However, while discussing the security of the states, their behavior, and their interaction, the distinction must be made both between variables at the level of the states and variables at the level of the system.⁸ “States are not and never have been the only international actors,”⁹ says Waltz. Robert Hunter concludes, “In terms of mobilizing military power, nation-states do not have a complete monopoly.”¹⁰

International order is possible without world government because states recognize that they have certain interests and some values in common, regard themselves bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions—diplomacy, war, international law, and balance of power.¹¹ According to Jessica Mathews,

The state’s central task of assuring security is the least affected, but still not exempt. War will not disappear, but with the shrinkage of U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, the transformation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty into a permanent covenant in 1995, agreement on the long-sought Comprehensive Test Ban treaty in 1996, and the likely entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, the security threat to states from other states is on a downward course. Nontraditional threats, however, are rising—terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, ethnic conflict, and the combination of rapid population growth, environmental decline, and poverty that breeds economic stagnation, political instability, and, sometimes, state collapse.¹²

⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 126, in Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security,” *International Security*, Vol. 27, No.1 (Summer 2002), p 152.

⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979, Chapter 5, p. 79.

⁹ Ibid., p. 93.

¹⁰ Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost, *The Global Century: Globalization and National Security*, NDU Press, 2001, Chapter 4, Robert E. Hunter, “Global Economics and Unsteady Regional Geopolitics,” p. 115.

¹¹ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, second edition, London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1995, p. 13, in James P. Muldoon, Jr., *The Architecture of Global Governance*, Colorado: Westview Press, 2004, p. 6.

¹² Jessica T. Mathews, p. 50.

These trends have created a growing sense of security shifting from the traditional nation-state's security pattern represented by foreign relations and military strength. Consequently, security is now viewed as emerging from daily human aspects related to food, shelter, employment, health, and public safety. In this context, Jessica Mathew asserts that,

The new technologies encourage noninstitutional, shifting networks over the fixed bureaucratic hierarchies ... They dissolve issues' and institutions' ties to a fixed place. And by greatly empowering individuals, they weaken the relative attachment to community, of which the preeminent one in modern society is the nation-state.¹³

Indeed, the classical nation-state model may simply no longer be the problem-solving element. Transnational, regional, and even global entities better fit the dimensions of trends in economics, resources, and security. Therefore, Jessica Mathews notes:

Whether the rise of nonstate actors ultimately turns out to be good news or bad will depend on whether humanity can launch itself on a course of rapid social innovation. Needed adaptations include ... international institutions that can efficiently serve the dual masters of states and citizenry, and, above all, new institutions and political entities that match the transnational scope of today's challenges¹⁴

It is clear that states, the elementary units in the international system, feel they need more capable international organizations to deal with transnational challenges. Thus they vote for new forms of international intervention reasserting the principle how they interfere in their domestic affairs. They hand international organizations sweeping new responsibilities and then rein them in with mandates or inadequate funding.¹⁵

The collapse of the strategic rivalry in the early 1990s uncovered many weaknesses in the design of the international system's infrastructure. Private non-state actors seized the opportunity to fill the political and economic space that states had abandoned.¹⁶

¹³ Ibid., p. 67.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 59.

¹⁶ James P. Muldoon, Jr., *The Architecture of Global Governance*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 2004), p. 259.

Samuel Huntington characterizes the world order as the interaction between the West¹⁷ and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. He argues that

the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics.¹⁸

Non-Western civilizations will continue to attempt to acquire the wealth, technology, skills, machines and weapons that are part of being modern.This will require the West to maintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its interests in relation to these civilizations.¹⁹

Above all, the international community, working through the United Nations (UN), has played a constructive role in encouraging reconciliation between states. The United Nations was originally conceived as a coalition of the nations fighting and winning against Germany and Japan. Soon, it became a battlefield for the Cold War. Today, the UN is facing several challenges in avoiding its growing marginalization. It is clear that this organization must find new ways to function with not only other international organizations but also with a number of nongovernmental actors.²⁰

NATO allies found themselves dealing with all consequences and asking the fundamental question if NATO was still needed with no Soviet threat. Thus the 1991 NATO concept said that NATO's policies and force posture should be adapted to the new geopolitical changes. Furthermore, the Washington Summit of 1999 produced a new strategic concept and a Defense Capability Initiative (DCI) leading to the necessary NATO's transformation articulated later in NATO Summit 2002 in Prague. However, the

¹⁷ Western civilization has two major variants, European and North American.

¹⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993; 72, 3; ABI/INFORM Global p. 22.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 49.

²⁰ Rolf Ekeus, "New Challenges for the United Nations," in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, p. 517-521.

agenda of NATO's future orientation will again be discussed in the next NATO Summit in Istanbul in the spring of 2004.

B. GEOPOLITICAL CHANGES

New security challenges emphasize the need to transform all elements of the security environment concerning collective defense, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction. In this vein, James Muldoon said, "Immense changes on a global scale—some of it integrative, and some disintegrative—continue to unfold; new patterns of interaction are being developed; a global system is emerging."²¹ It seemed that "the ending of the Cold War enabled a considerable strengthening of the world organizations,"²² and political organization and commitments would likely supplant military deployments as the basic aspect of security arrangement. It also became clear that military power would remain relevant, but not as dominant as before—smaller forces would replace the large formations. The security adaptation and innovation were required.

1. Post-Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War brought a novel redistribution of power among states, markets, and civil society. Nation-states began sharing political, social, and security roles with businesses, with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens groups.²³ At the time, the United States was the world's superpower with unparalleled global military and economic might.²⁴ It seemed that the new, emerging system had nothing to fear any longer. Reasonably, it was an opportunity for the U.S. to establish a global cooperative order. In this vein, President George Bush envisioned the world as "a new partnership of nations that transcends the Cold War. A partnership based on

²¹ James P. Muldoon, Jr., p. 4.

²² Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair, eds., *Approaches to Global Governance Theory*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), p. 13.

²³ Jessica T. Mathews, p. 50.

²⁴ Michael G. Schechter, "International Institutions: Obstacles, Agents, or Conduits of Global Structural Change?" in *Innovation in Multilateralism*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1999, p. 7.

consultation, cooperation, and collective action, especially through international and regional organizations.”²⁵

However, the international system after dismantling geopolitical blocs became more fluid and unpredictable. In this context, Harlan Cleveland pointed out:

The world of the 1990s and beyond is fundamentally different from anything in our cultural memory of international relations. No ‘power’ has the power to undertake on its own responsibility ‘to make the world safe for diversity.’ It is already apparent that a nobody-in-charge world will be more volatile and more crisis-prone than the potentially fatal yet eerily stable confrontation of nuclear-tipped superpowers glaring at each other from their hardened silos.²⁶

Indeed, early on in the post-Cold War period, the increasing number of intra-state conflicts²⁷ and failed states were heavily taxing the international system’s capacity to respond. A new order undermined state sovereignty and the states system and was contributing to a sense of uncertainty and chaos in the world.²⁸ There was a need to develop a new security architecture that would adapt the security relationships in response to the dramatically changed environment. Through a strategy of “engagement and enlargement” the U.S. supported an integration of democratic Europe cooperating with the U.S. to keep the peace and promote prosperity.²⁹ President Clinton’s comprehensive strategy (1995) built on the success and enduring value of NATO while also strengthening other institutions with a critical role to play in European integration. Besides accelerating NATO’s transformation, its key elements included enhancing the Partnership for Peace, developing a gradual, deliberate, and transparent process of NATO enlargement, enhancing the cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia, supporting European integration as embodied in the

²⁵ George H. W. Bush, "The U.N.: World Parliament of Peace," address to the U.N. General Assembly, New York, 1 October 1990, in *Dispatch* (U.S. Department of State), vol. 1, No. 6, October 8, p. 152.

²⁶ Harlan Cleveland, *Birth of a New World*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1993, p. 78.

²⁷ In places like the Balkans (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) and throughout Africa (Somalia, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia/Eritrea).

²⁸ James P. Muldoon, Jr., p. 261.

²⁹ *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO*, Office of International Security Affairs, June 1995, p.8, available at: <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com/ciuniv/printdoc>>, accessed 15 December 2003.

European Union (EU), and strengthening the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).³⁰ David Yost said that the end of the Cold War

obliged the Allies to redefine NATO's purposes and to endow it with new roles in addition to its traditional core missions of collective defense and dialogue with adversaries In conjunction with the pursuit of these two new roles the Alliance has been engaged in a complex process of internal adaptation. This process includes the establishment of new institutions intended to promote an even closer political control over military operations such as crisis management and peacekeeping; a certain 'Europeanization,' with more attention to structural changes conducive to the emergence of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI); and a greater flexibility for the ad hoc improvisation of effective 'coalitions of the willing' through Combined Joint Task Forces.³¹

All in all, the end of the Cold War brought radical shifts in power away from states to non-state actors. A clear Cold War danger was replaced by potential future risks, imminent threats by unspecified hazards. The state-centric international order was coming undone as the mechanisms of cooperation and coordination among states no longer seemed capable of managing the rapidly expanding global agenda. Policymakers were thus forced to adjust NATO's principles to the altered security conditions and to develop a new strategy.

2. Globalization

Globalization is a complex phenomenon producing significant political, economic, and social effects that marries technology to the spread of ideas.³² It results in great difficulty in predicting the ultimate impact on societies, both domestic and international. Friedman said that

What is new is the system; what is old is power politics, chaos, clashing civilizations and liberalism. And what is the drama of the post-Cold War world is the interaction between this new system and all these old passions and aspirations. It is a complex drama, with the final act still not written.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 72.

³² Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost, *The Global Century: Globalization and National Security*, (NDU Press, 2001), Chapter 4, Robert E. Hunter, "Global Economics and Unsteady Regional Geopolitics," p. 109.

That is why under the globalization system you will find both clashes of civilization and the homogenization of civilizations, both environmental disasters and amazing environmental rescues, both the triumph of liberal, free-market capitalism and a backlash against it, both the durability of nation-states and the rise of enormously powerful nonstate actors.³³

Globalization today is having a number of effects with various risks and benefits. The central features of globalization are the rapid, growing, and uneven cross-border flow of goods, services, people, money, technology, information, ideas, culture, crime, and weapons. Whereas new information technologies weave the world together even tighter, the dynamics of globalization have eroded the core principle of the international system—sovereignty and security. Dennis Pirages notes that “These rapid changes in the human condition are increasing many kinds of insecurity, ranging from bioinvasion to terrorism, and now represent a major discontinuity in ongoing evolutionary processes.”³⁴

Foremost, globalization has contributed to the creation of fertile breeding grounds for terrorism. Dr. Muqtedar Khan noted, “It is ironic that global terrorism, the phenomenon of terrorists operating in and against several nations simultaneously, was facilitated by globalization and now it has become the biggest challenge to globalization.”³⁵ Transnational threats, such as international crime syndicates, terrorist networks, and drug cartels could continue to grow in strength and influence, thriving among autocratic, weak, or failed nation-states. Ethnic rivalries, nationalism, religious-based antagonisms, and competition for scarce resources, including water, could go unresolved as well. Thus, a series of crises would undoubtedly arise, especially as the world’s population continues to grow.

On the whole, despite its apparent positive impact on the spread of democracy and free-market economies, globalization redefines the international security environment, as well as many other aspects of human affairs. Globalization creates new threats and the defense against them requires more synergy and dynamism adopting a complex of

³³ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, (New York: First Anchor, April 2002), p. xxii.

³⁴ Dennis Pirages, “Globalization: States, Markets, and Global Public Goods,” presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, 24-27 March 2002, in James P. Muldoon, Jr., *The Architecture of Global Governance*, Colorado: Westview Press, 2004, p. 262.

³⁵ Dr. Muqtedar Khan, “Terrorism and Globalization,” Global Affairs, available at: <<http://www.glocaleye.org/terglo.htm>>, accessed 20 January 2004.

political, military, economic, legal and social interconnections. Potential interests obviously remain in building and maintaining coalitions with allies to channel the effects of globalization.

3. September 11, 2001

The terrorist attacks of September 11 against the United States also irrevocably altered the world security environment. In this regard, the National Security Strategy of the United States declares:

The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.³⁶

September 11 was also a grave alert for the international community, aiming at the inadequacies of the interstate system to govern a rapidly changing, globalizing world. “The underside of globalization had demonstrated its destructive power and ability to exploit the international system’s vulnerabilities,”³⁷ Muldoon wrote. September 11 was not just an attack on the United States; it was an attack on the world. As a consequence, 69 nations began supporting the global war on terrorism at the time.³⁸

America’s economic, military, and political reaction to the attacks has strengthened the United States dominance in the international system. However, some international responses to the acceleration of American power suggested the possibility of an anti-American backlash. A feeling of dependence combined with uncertainty over the motivations of American power bred reservations and resistance.³⁹

After September 11, global politics was transformed. Prior to the attacks, the dominant issues were geo-economic in nature. Thereafter, geopolitics and security

³⁶ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, The White House, 17 September 2002.

³⁷ James P. Muldoon, Jr., p. 1.

³⁸ Department of Defense, United States of America, Fact Sheet, “International Contributions to the War against Terrorism,” 7 June 2002, revised 14 June 2002, Office of Public Affairs, No 703-697-5131.

³⁹ Kori Schake and Klaus Becher, “How America Should Lead,” Policy Review, No. 114, available at: <http://www.policyreview.org/AUG02/schake_print.html>, accessed 8 August 2002.

concerns have once again become the central issue.⁴⁰ NATO did not become less important after September 11. The attacks of September 11 and a rapid and steadfast response proved transatlantic continuing values and NATO's importance. Invoking Article 5 for the first time in its history, NATO sent a clear message that the Alliance was determined to react to defeat terrorism.⁴¹ However, September 11 confirmed that NATO must transform while facing new threats and new challenges. By this, NATO entered a new period of its existence evolving from the organization of collective defense to the organization of collective security.

C. ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The goal of this part is to characterize the gravity of threats briefly as their potential has changed the definition of self-defense and collective security. Owing to their complexity, such threats cannot be fully enumerated even by intelligence services.

History demonstrated that unexpected changes could transform the geopolitical landscape and new technologies could revolutionize the form and the nature of threats. Although the Cold War threats vanished, the world remained plagued by oppression, ethnic conflict, the spread of weapon technology and terrorism. Globally organized terrorist groups changed the international security conventions. Failed states, countries without a capable or responsible government that could not control their own territory or the actions of terrorist organizations operating within the state's territory, deteriorated global security.

The importance of regional stability emphasizes the fact that crises or insurgencies might destabilize some states and consequently relevant regions. Thus, an unpredictable development in one region could escalate to engagement in another region, with the implication of a global conflict. For example, the Kosovo conflict entailed a requirement for NATO to extend temporary protection to Macedonia and Albania.

⁴⁰ Dr. Muqtedar Khan, "Terrorism and Globalization," Global Affairs, available at: <<http://www.glocaleye.org/terglo.htm>>, accessed 20 January 2004..

⁴¹ Marc Grossman, "21st Century NATO: New Capabilities, New Members, New Relationships," available at: <<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0302/ijpe/pj71grossman.htm>>, accessed 7 September 2003.

Similarly, there might be several circumstances in which the use or threat of use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would have effects across regions.⁴²

No wonder that Western interests focus on the energy resources of the Middle East, a region in which several states pose conventional military challenges and many seek or have acquired chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive (CBRNE) weapons. These weapons tend to extend to other unstable or unpredictable areas.⁴³

The Caucasus issue is predominant in helping the Transcaucasian states ratify their independence and also to expand their capacities to produce energy. Along the southern border of Russia, a new geostrategic context of Russo-Chinese relations is evolving while also extending to Central Asia and parts of the Middle East.⁴⁴

As great differences still exist among the world's multiple regions, China, Japan, the United States, and other countries are all reevaluating their strategic priorities. The consequence may mean greater instability if events are not handled properly. Although still poor and internally troubled, China is achieving enormous economic gains owing to globalization, and India is making progress as well. As both countries gain economic strength, they will likely pursue traditional geopolitical goals rather than integration with the U.S.-led democratic community.⁴⁵

Maintaining a stable balance in Asia emphasizes the security aspect as potential military competitors with formidable resources may emerge in the region.⁴⁶ According to Hunter,

China's status in East Asia will clearly be a major focus of both regional and international developments for the foreseeable future; it will also involve Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States. Recent diplomatic moves on the Korean Peninsula have

⁴² Robert E. Hunter, p. 115.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost, *The Global Century: Globalization and National Security*, (NDU Press, 2001), Chapter 1, Stephen J. Flanagan, "Meeting the Challenges of the Global Century," pp. 20-21.

⁴⁶ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 30 September 2001, Chapter I, p. 4.

provided particular evidence of the potential for a large impact on the broader East Asian system.⁴⁷

While Europe is moving toward peaceful unity and Latin America is making progress on economic integration and political stability, Russia and its neighbors are falling behind the prosperous democracies because of their less adaptive political cultures, declining infrastructures, and distorted or incomplete market reforms.⁴⁸

Africa remains poverty-stricken, and the tradition-laden Middle East and Persian Gulf face economic struggles and a stressful security environment. Asia is the key, but its economics and security affairs may be pulling in different directions.⁴⁹

Russia at present does not pose a large-scale conventional military threat and shares some important security concerns with the U.S. and Europe, including the problem of vulnerability by ballistic missiles attacks from regional aggressors, accidental or unauthorized launches of strategic weapons, and the threat of international terrorism. However, Russia still pursues policy objectives contrary to Western interests concerning the potential spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.⁵⁰

New technologies and the rapid advancement of military affairs pose a danger as the pace and scale of recent ballistic missile proliferation has exceeded all expectations. Likewise, the biotechnology revolution holds the probability of increasing threats as well. Technological advances create the potential that competitions will develop in space and cyber space. Space and information operations have become the backbone of networked, highly distributed commercial civilian and military capabilities. This opens up the possibility that space control will become a key objective in future military and economic competition. Similarly, states will likely develop offensive information operations and be compelled to devote resources to protecting critical information infrastructure from disruption.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Hunter, pp. 117-118.

⁴⁸ Stephen J. Flanagan, pp. 20-21.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 30 September 2001, Current Security Trends, p. 5.

⁵¹ Ibid, Chapter I, p. 7.

Thus, the current international security environment incorporates: first, a reality with the major powers and their alliances; second, regional powers operating and carrying out their regional conflicts; third, the failing states, civil wars and the breeding grounds of non-state violence and of terrorism. Religious hatred, nationalist confrontation, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism—each of these elements is dangerous enough. If these elements combine and aggravate one other, then they would create a new strategic threat.⁵²

D. TERRORISM AND PROLIFERATION OF WMD

The new global environment and WMD have changed the nature of terrorism and terrorism is changing the world. Although terrorism is not a new phenomenon in international affairs, it has never had as much strategic significance as nowadays. Whereas it was considered as a weapon of the weak, the evolution of terrorism leading to the use of WMD changed it to the strategic threat character.⁵³ Technological advances helped to provide a potential for asymmetrical warfare—the ability of a relatively small power or a nonstate actor to cause destruction and hence to have a political impact.⁵⁴ Furthermore, the countries with simmering interstate and intrastate tensions that fell or are falling behind in the global economy could tend to support terrorism and pursue the development of WMD.⁵⁵ Additionally, the greater ease of transportation increased the capacity of terrorists to act in different places. Therefore, the fear of nuclear proliferation related to the ability of potential actors to employ force beyond their proportions has become a leading factor in security environment.⁵⁶

Indeed, the potential of WMD and their possible proliferation have a significant impact on international security environment. In this vein, the National Security Strategy

⁵² Joschka Fischer, “Europe and the Future of the Transatlantic Relations,” Speech by German Foreign Minister at Princeton University, 19 November 2003, *Council on Foreign Relations*, available at: <http://www.cfr.org/reg_index.php?id=5|||1>, accessed 11 January 2004.

⁵³ Geoffrey Kemp, “Military Technology and Conflict,” in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, p. 88-89.

⁵⁴ Robert E. Hunter, p. 115.

⁵⁵ Stephen J. Flanagan, p. 13.

⁵⁶ Robert E. Hunter, p. 115.

of the United States declares that “mass civilian casualties are the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction.”⁵⁷ The fact that eleven countries currently have nuclear weapons programs and thirteen more countries have been actively seeking them evidently defines the threat potential. Additionally, more than 25 countries now possess ballistic missiles, and over 75,000 cruise missiles are in existence, with the number expected to rise to between 80,000 and 90,000 by 2010.⁵⁸ Since the number of states possessing ballistic missiles has increased as well as missiles’ effective ranges, the geographic position does not guarantee immunity from unpredictable attacks.⁵⁹

Subsequently, chemical and biological weapons will grow in importance because they are potentially as devastating as nuclear weapons. They are relatively cheap and easy to disguise within commercial ventures. Nowadays, at least, 17 countries have active chemical and biological weapon programs, and the number is rising.⁶⁰ According to the Alliance’s Strategic Concept,

Commodities and technology that could be used to build these weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means are becoming more common, while detection and prevention of illicit trade in these materials and know-how continues to be difficult. No doubts that non-state actors have the potential to create and use some of these weapons.⁶¹

Anyway, the new terrorism has different motives, different actors, different sponsors and the demonstrably greater lethality. Today’s terrorists have proven very adaptive at learning from previous generations and changed their tactics in response to new anti-terrorist measures.⁶² Terrorists now can easily threaten as they are loosely organized in less hierarchical structures and can make use of amateurs to a far greater

⁵⁷ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, Chapter V, p.15.

⁵⁸ Michael O’Hanlon, “Cruise Control: A Case for Missile Defense,” *The National Interest*, No. 67, April 2002, available at: <<http://www.nationalinterest.org/issues/67/Ohanlon.html>>.

⁵⁹ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 30 September 2001, Chapter I, p. 1-12.

⁶⁰ Carl W. Ford, Jr., Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the topic of “Reducing the Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons,” March 19, 2002, p. 3.

⁶¹ *The Alliance’s Strategic Concept*, the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C., 24 April 1999, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>>.

⁶² Rod Probst, “New Terrorists, New Attack Means: Categorizing Terrorist Challenges for the Early 21st Century,” *Journal of Homeland Security*, March 22, 2002.

extent than in the past. Therefore, the new terrorism is global, it is decentralized, it uses new strategies and tactics, and it is increasingly focused upon building the capacity for mass casualty and mass destruction attacks, in an effort to destabilize entire societal systems. Hence, terrorist attacks could entail the use of any imaginable weapon: conventional, chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological and informational, individually or in combination. All of this complicates the task of intelligence gathering and counterterrorism.⁶³

The risk of WMD proliferation is emblematic of the new threats associated with globalization. WMD proliferation could give local crises a global dimension. Even though a global war resulting from a confrontation between competing communities seems less likely, global chaos resulting from a general loss of political control with devastating consequences does not seem impossible.⁶⁴ For an illustration, President Bush's 2005 budget proposal stresses the imperative to fight terrorism while calling for multibillion-dollar increases: "a 14.4% increase for the nearly year-old Department of Homeland Security and other related programs, bringing spending there to about \$47.4 billion."⁶⁵

⁶³ Lesser, LO., Bruce Hoffman, John Arquila, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, "Countering the New Terrorism," 1999, RAND, Santa Monica.

⁶⁴ Geoffrey Kemp, "Military Technology and Conflict," in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), p. 88-89.

⁶⁵ Mimi Hall, Tom Squitieri and Kevin Johnson, "Generous Boost for Homeland Defense Ridge: Increase Would Improve Airport Security," USA TODAY, 3 February 2004, available at: <<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20040203/5891831s.htm>>.

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III. TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY ARRANGEMENT

Established in Washington on 4th April 1949, NATO prevented Soviet domination of Western Europe. It helped create a political and economic cooperation among its members and consequently stabilized the transatlantic region. According to Stanley Sloan,

the Treaty itself was based on common values, identified no enemy, protected the sovereign decision-making rights of all members, and was written in sufficiently flexible language to facilitate adjustments to accommodate changing international circumstances.⁶⁶

The Treaty provided for mutual assistance should any one member of the alliance be attacked. This linked the United States and particularly its nuclear power to the defense of Western Europe as an essential factor of deterrence. NATO was thus a product of the containment policy introduced by George Kennan and implemented by the president of the United States Harry S. Truman (1945-52) and his Secretaries of State, George Marshall (1947-49) and Dean Acheson (1949-52). Dean Acheson maintained that “the central idea of the treaty is not a static one,” and he stressed that “the North Atlantic Treaty is far more than a defensive arrangement.”⁶⁷ Consequently, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were aspects of the same policy that attempted to stop the spread of Soviet Communism and make Europe stronger. In this regard, Donald Abenheim noted:

Europeans wanted real protection, not parasitic security and defense relationships that would leave them in a strategic no man’s land as in 1919-1939 and in 1944-1946. NATO membership can finally banish the enduring ill effects of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact (1939) and the Yalta agreements (1945) that divided Europe and prefigured the outbreak of the cold war in Central and Eastern Europe.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered*, (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), p. 3.

⁶⁷ Don Cook, *Forging the Alliance* (New York: Arbor House, 1989), p. 114, in Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered*, (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), p. 4.

⁶⁸ Donald Abenheim, “Strategic Insight the Big Bang of NATO Enlargement: Goetterdaemmerung or Rebirth?” Center for Contemporary Conflict, National Security Affairs Department, NPS Monterey, California. 1 February 2003.

The threat, the Soviet Union's capacity to attack Western Europe, vanished almost immediately with the democratic revolution in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 when both the Warsaw Pact and the Iron Curtain disappeared. The spread of democracy and the free market diminished the creation of new dividing lines and predetermined NATO's position as stated in the NATO Strategic Concept 1991:

The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defense ... The role of the Alliance's military forces is to assure the territorial integrity and political independence of its member states, and thus to contribute to peace and stability in Europe.⁶⁹

The following NATO Strategic Concept 1999 updated the 1991 Strategic Concept to make it consistent with the new security environment. While endorsing the openness to new members under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, it stressed the cooperation with other institutions, allies, partners and Mediterranean Dialogue countries and the need for improving military capabilities and preparedness:

We pledge to improve our defence capabilities to fulfill the full range of the Alliance's 21st century missions. We will continue to build confidence and security through arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation measures. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorism and our determination to protect ourselves against this scourge.⁷⁰

Hence, by emphasizing transatlantic cooperation, it was marked a new tendency to solving global problems. However, September 2001 was a cruel reminder that the world was still a dangerous place. America seized the initiative to recast global politics by leading a war on terrorism, yet Europe, understanding that defeat in this war was not an option, had to cooperate in the diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, humanitarian, and economic fields.⁷¹ Therefore, both sides of the Atlantic were pushed to create the potential for even closer cooperation within a stronger NATO and, in European conception, a more cooperative and unified Europe toward a more authoritative United Nations.

⁶⁹ *North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept*, 7 November 1991, paragraph 36.

⁷⁰ *The Washington Declaration*, the NAC meeting, Washington, D.C., 23 - 24 April 1999, Par. 7, Press Release NAC-S(99)63, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-063e.htm>>, accessed 18 May 2003.

⁷¹ The Konrad Adenauer Foundation, "The Significance of the Transatlantic Partnership: An American Perspective," 15 September 2003, available at: <<http://www.hagel.senate.gov/Press/pressapp/report/report.cfm?id=211634>>, accessed 19 January 2004.

A. AMERICAN SECURITY STRATEGY

The world wars and the challenge of containment doctrine compelled the US to build strong military and project power throughout the world. In this regard, Henry Kissinger stated:

In the twentieth century, no country has influenced international relations as decisively and at the same time as ambivalently as the United States ... No nation has been more pragmatic in the day-to-day conduct of its diplomacy, or more ideological in the pursuit of its historic moral convictions. No country has been more reluctant to engage itself abroad even while undertaking alliances and commitments of unprecedented reach and scope.⁷²

In the first decade following the Cold War, the U.S. reduced defense expenditures, taking the opportunity to shift resources to other priorities. Therefore, the U.S. began reviewing force levels in Europe and then in 1991 began the largest downsizing of active duty forces permanently stationed in Europe since the 1940s. The reorientation of U.S. strategic deterrence away from Russia and toward proliferators of WMD and rogue regimes shifted U.S. policy to the Middle East. This enabled the U.S. to come to terms with the full implications of preventive war strategies and also raised questions about the relevance of nuclear deterrence as a basis for strategic relations in the region.⁷³

The terrorist attacks of September 11 and its aftermath dramatically refocused the U.S. priorities. As the September 2001 events demonstrated, the geographic position of the United States no longer guaranteed immunity from a direct attack on its population, territory, and infrastructure. It fundamentally changed the security context for relations between the United States and Europe and opened new opportunities. As a result, combating terrorism, rogue states, and the proliferation of WMD became the major overriding imperatives.

The today United States plays the decisive role in world affairs by providing a world police, a global market place, a global currency, and a global example of how

⁷² Henry A. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York: Touchstone, 1994, p. 17-18.

⁷³ James A. Russell and James J. Wirtz, "Nuclear Weapons, War with Iraq, and U.S. Security Strategy in the Middle East," 9 August 2002, Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School.

people of different nationalities, religions, and ethnic backgrounds can live and work in a democratic society. Regarding this point, President George W. Bush said:

The fellowship of generations is the cause of common beliefs. We believe in open societies ordered by moral conviction. We believe in private markets, humanized by compassionate government. We believe in economies that reward effort, communities that protect the weak, and the duty of nations to respect the dignity and the rights of all.⁷⁴

By the same token, as stated in the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* of 30 September 2001, America's goals are to promote peace, to sustain freedom, and to encourage prosperity. U.S. leadership is premised on sustaining an international system that is respectful of the rule of law.⁷⁵ That is the reason the Western civilization, led by the U.S., dominates the present world.

The essence of American security policy is primarily embedded in several documents: the *Joint Vision 2020*, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (September 2001), *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (September 2002), *Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* (December 2002), *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (February 2003), *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* (December 2002), and others. While the *Joint Vision 2020* extends the conceptual template to guide the continuing transformation of America's armed forces, the *National Security Strategy* is a strategy capable to respond terrorism effectively. It implies acting preemptively and globally: "America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe."⁷⁶ Thus, the overall goal of all concepts is the creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations—persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ George Bush, in a speech during his state visit to the United Kingdom, 19 November 2003, Council on Foreign Relations, available at: <http://www.cfr.org/reg_index.php?id=5||1>, accessed 10 February 2004.

⁷⁵ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 30 September 2001, "America's Security in the 21st Century," p. 1.

⁷⁶ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, The White House, Sept. 17, 2002, available at: <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>>.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

The United States pursues its interests globally and therefore requires an apparatus to implement its power dominance. The U.S. defense strategy is premised on efforts to strengthen America's alliances and partnerships and to develop new forms of security cooperation. The American commitment to these security arrangements bolsters the security of U.S. allies and friends. Likewise, as witnessed in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States, NATO's invocation of Article 5 demonstrated the commitment of America's partners to a collective defense, which bolstered the security of the United States. These mutually reinforcing security relationships underpin the political stability on which the prosperity of civilized nations is built. And these arrangements are based on the recognition that a nation can be safe at home only if it is willing and able to contribute to effective security partnerships abroad.⁷⁸ Provided that, David Yost notes,

the U.S. will remain committed to NATO, and only because it remains the main institution through which America can exert influence in European security affairs. Simply, on geostrategic grounds, without considering shared values and other factors, America's military presence in Europe is essential to defend US and Western economic and security interest in the Middle East and beyond.⁷⁹

“For the foreseeable future, the United States will almost surely remain the world's dominant military power,” Robert Hunter anticipates furthermore adding that

however, its role may be challenged militarily in niche areas. Or the United States could be challenged politically and economically where military superiority is not particularly relevant. For example, asymmetrical warfare need not be just about military capabilities and their application, but rather can be found in other areas that affect U.S. interests. Thus, there is rising concern about so-called cyber warfare, which would employ technological weapons—targeted at hardware, at software, or simply at processes—that in many cases should properly be seen as economic in character.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 30 September 2001, “Strengthening Alliances and Partnership,” p. 14-15.

⁷⁹ David S. Yost, “Transatlantic Relations and Peace in Europe,” *International Affairs*, Vol.78, No.2, April 2002, p. 270.

⁸⁰ Hunter, p 120.

B. EUROPEAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENT

Since the European Defense Community proposal failed in the 1950s, Europeans sought a European concept of common defense that was independent from NATO but closely coordinated. Americans have reacted with ambivalence, welcoming the notion that Europeans could do more in their own defense but worrying lest that effort undermines transatlantic ties and NATO. Europeans accepted the increasing need for greater European responsibilities and the development of a European security identity and defense role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance. This in fact was accomplished in a framework anchored in NATO, the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).

The Maastricht Treaty (1992) reflected the new European approach to the post-Cold War developments. The process of integration was concluded with the creation of the European Union.⁸¹ The ideas of the common market (including an unrestricted flow of goods, labor, and capital) were incorporated in a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which included the eventual framing of a common defense policy. Then, the Europeans in Maastricht (1992) reaffirmed their goal of a ESDI—part of but apart from NATO—and at its Summit in April 1999 NATO and the U.S. endorsed that goal.⁸²

Changes in European security arrangements initiated the St. Malo Declaration (1998), which marked the beginning of a new chapter in relations between NATO and European Union. NATO members acknowledged the result of St. Malo at the April 1999 NATO Washington Summit with the involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operation. It was also agreed to address issues of assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities and assets as was agreed in Berlin in 1996. Thereafter, an important stage was reached at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, where European Union leaders set the goal of developing a rapid reaction force by 2003. This force would consist of 50,000 to 60,000 troops, in addition to air and naval elements, and would be

⁸¹ In fact, it was established in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined in 1973, Greece in 1981, Portugal and Spain in 1986, and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995.

⁸² European Security, *European Security and Defense Policy*, available at: <<http://www.basicint.org/europe/ESDP/main.htm>>, accessed 10 January 2004.

deployable within 60 days and sustainable for up to a year. It would be used by the European Union for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking—so-called the Petersberg tasks as agreed by the Western European Union⁸³ in 1992. They were subsequently incorporated by the European Union into the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty.⁸⁴

The aim of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) launched by the Allies at Washington 1999 was to strengthen the military capabilities of all Allies, not just those of European Allies. Many of the needs, such as greater air and sea lift, overlap with those which the European Allies had to address in developing the EU rapid reaction force. The implementation required substantial restructuring of the armed forces and increased defense spending.⁸⁵ Under those circumstances, Europe faced a huge problem as social reconstructing with relevant spending throughout the contingent was prioritized to security at that time. It seemed that Europe was not able and not willing to spend additional money on reforming the armed forces, which still possessed a Cold War character.

A further progress in relations between the European Union and NATO occurred with the first meetings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the EU interim Political and Security Committee (iPSC) in Brussels in September and November 2000. Ambassadors highlighted issues to be reported at the upcoming EU Council meeting in Nice and at meetings of the NATO foreign and defense ministers in December 2000. Additionally, NATO provided military technical advice to the European Union's Headline Goal Task Force that would be needed for the rapid reaction force, on the basis of proposed crisis scenarios. This prepared the way for the EU capabilities commitment conference held in Brussels on 20 November 2000, where 100,000 troops, 400 aircraft

⁸³ The Western European Union was established by the 1948 Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Subsequently, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain also joined the organization.

⁸⁴ NATO On-line library, "Strengthening European Security and Defence Capabilities," available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/dev-esdi.htm>>, accessed 11 January 2004.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

and 100 ships were pledged to the future rapid reaction force with complementary forces of 15 non-EU European countries.⁸⁶

The EU-NATO arrangements of the so-called Berlin Plus enhanced the operational capability of the EU and provided the framework for the strategic partnership between both organizations in crisis management. As NATO and the European Union solved this problem and finally agreed to use NATO's assets, Nicholas Burns, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, commented on the achievement in the European security issues:

In March [2003], NATO and the European Union concluded, after four years of often frustrating negotiations, the Berlin-Plus arrangements that formalize how the two organizations will work together on security missions. They are designed to ensure that NATO and the EU remain partners and not competitors as both broaden their roles. The heart of the deal was the EU's agreement to use NATO assets for its missions rather than creating its own headquarters or military planning staff. It permits NATO to make our military assets, such as Shape's prodigious planning capabilities, available to the EU on an if asked basis. It lays out clear procedures for how NATO, as the overall leader in transatlantic security operations, can ensure that the European Union has the support it needs.⁸⁷

When Javier Solana, the EU Secretary General/High Representative, presented the European Security Strategy for adoption by the European Council, he mentioned that the EU aim is an effective and balanced partnership with the U.S. and this had become an additional reason for the EU to increase its capabilities and its coherence.⁸⁸ Therefore, the point of the CFSP and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is to unite the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programs and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from member states and other instruments. Javier Solana expressed that EU made some progress toward a foreign policy and effective crisis management, but Europe needed to be more active in pursuing its strategic objectives

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ R. Nicholas Burns, "The New NATO: Healing the Rift," U.S. Ambassador to NATO Remarks to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Brussels, 27 May 2003, available at: <<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/21241.htm>>, accessed 10 December 2003.

⁸⁸ *European Security Strategy*, Javier SOLANA while submitting the European Security Strategy for adoption by the European Council, 8 December 2003, 1589/03, PESC 787.

to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention ... including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.⁸⁹

Indeed, security is the first condition for the European development as the EU, a power of 450 million people, is standing at a key turning point in its history to include ten new member states⁹⁰ and a radical reform of its system toward a European constitution. However, Kilian Straus illustrates that Europe has its demographic problem and its weakness:

the gap between East and West in Europe will remain considerable, both in economic and in administrative terms. Economic conversion is likely to last up to twenty years while some behavioral patterns developed in forty years of totalitarianism will need up to a generation to disappear. The inefficient administration, the related corruption, and many of the social issues will complicate a successful reform. The accession states' capacity to adapt and the old members' reply to the adaptation efforts will therefore be key measures.⁹¹

Beyond this, the question remains whether an augmented European Union will ever become a political entity acting on the international stage. As the international system has not been well developed and always needed a strong leadership role, the European Union, while becoming "a major supranational innovation"⁹² of today will surely pursue its success at the global level by providing a major contribution to the development of a new system of global governance and ensuring that multilateral dialogue and the rule of law would become the pillars of international relations.⁹³

Then, given this point, Peter van Ham and Richard Kugler assert,

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 13.

⁹⁰ On 1 May 2004, the European Union will enlarge from 15 to 25 members accepting Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. The next enlargement of Bulgaria and Romania is expected by 2007.

⁹¹ Kilian Straus, "Europe or Death: The Impact of the EU's Eastern Enlargement on the Future of Europe," Europe 2020, internet site, available at: <http://www.europe2020.org/en/section_elargis/index.htm>, accessed 9 February 2004.

⁹² George Soros, Cathryn Cluver, "Global Governance: Are the American and European Visions Compatible?" available at: <<http://www.theepc.net/en/default.asp?TYP=TEWN&LV=187&see=y&PG=ER/EN/detail&AI=374&l=>>>.

⁹³ Europe in the World, European Policy Centre, available at: <http://www.theepc.net/en/default.asp?TYP=TEWN&LV=187&see=y&PG=TEWN/EN/listing_t&l=4>>.

Europe has to convince America that its efforts to shape a credible CFSP and ESDP—both of which are required for the EU to take on more responsibility in the foreign policy, security, and defense areas—are not meant to balance America in any way, but are mainly to establish Europe as a credible and useful ally of the United States working toward a generally shared goal, but occasionally taking different routes. At times friction and modest disagreement will occur, but such a strong European voice is required to keep ‘the West’ both dynamic and credible to the rest of the world. Europe has to think for itself and be honest in its relationship with the United States. The result, inevitably, will be a more balanced NATO and a United States willing to listen to its traditional allies, not with aversion and displeasure, but as the useful and constructive voices that they are, or at least should strive to become.⁹⁴

C. TRANSATLANTIC DILEMMA

The U.S.-European relationship has not been fully harmonized as it had been several times at historic crossroads. For example, the Suez Crisis and Vietnam were bitter, as was President De Gaulle’s decision in 1966 to withdraw from NATO’s integrated military structure as well as the 1979 Two-Track Pershing Missile decision that eventually led to the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons in Europe.⁹⁵ Moreover, a confident and strong United States had to face an indecisive Europe searching for its own role and identity. In addition, politically, strategically, and even culturally, the United States and Europe also appeared to be slowly drifting apart as demonstrated by tangible differences on the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Ottawa Treaty—banning anti-personnel landmines, and the ABM treaty.

Under the threat from the Nazis and then Soviet Communism, America and Europe were united by a common threat. There was never total unity, but both sides of the Atlantic were united in a common effort. However, in the early years of the Cold War, the European economies were too weak to support sufficient military capacity for self-defense. But even when the European economies recovered later in the Cold War, the Europeans were not especially interested in closing differences in the burden sharing

⁹⁴ Peter van Ham and Richard L. Kugler, “Western Unity and Transatlantic Security Challenge,” *The Marshal Center Papers*, No. 4, 2002, pp.33-34.

⁹⁵ R. Nicholas Burns, Statement On the Future of NATO to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Statement by U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Brussels, 1 April 2003, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/usa/ambassador/2003/s030401a.htm>>, accessed 12 February 2004.

process. Moreover, the American nuclear guarantee deprived Europeans of the incentive to spend the kind of money that would have been necessary to restore their military power.

The end of the Cold War changed the dynamic of the American-European relationship. Operation Allied Force over Kosovo brought disillusion unveiling the growing gap in military capabilities between Europe and the United States.⁹⁶ It became clear that the capabilities could not be raised to U.S. levels without spending far more than most Europeans were prepared to pay.⁹⁷

After September 11, many NATO Europeans were dissatisfied with the small role that the Alliance played in the response to the terrorist attacks and attributed it to U.S. unilateralism and arrogance.

The crisis over Iraq immensely worsened the transatlantic relations. There were two primary disagreements whether Iraq should have been categorized as a problem of terrorism, and whether the U.S. has had the right to take action in Iraq without explicit authorization from the UN Security Council. The fact that Turkey could have a request for mutual defense assistance, based on a common threat (Article 4), turned down by the Alliance had seriously damaged NATO's credibility among U.S. legislators. Since Belgium, France, and Germany initially denied Turkey's routine request for NATO assets to defend against a possible Iraqi attack, the Alliance had to alter its decision to reach agreement on supporting Turkey.⁹⁸ Additionally, the French worried that war would increase Islamist terrorism, not decrease it. They argued that the United States' virtually abandoning efforts to stop the Israel-Palestinian conflict was grist to the terrorists' mill. They were skeptical that democracy could be brought to post-war Iraq, at least not

⁹⁶ European deficiencies included, for example, strategic lift, suppression of enemy air defenses, lack of all-weather precision bombing capability, insecure and obsolete tactical communications, inadequate intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities, and incompatible information systems.

⁹⁷ Lauren Van Metre, "Transatlantic Relations in the Aftermath of Kosovo," 15 May 2000, United States Institute of Peace, Special report 59, available at: <mhtml:file:///H:\New%20Folder\Transatlantic%20Relations%20In%20the%20Aftermath%20of%20>, accessed 5 February 2004.

⁹⁸ Owen Pengelly, "NATO's Angry Sponsors: The View from Capitol Hill," 13 June 2003, available at: <<http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/2003NATOAngrySponsors.htm>>, accessed 18 December 2003.

without costly and sustained U.S. and European engagement for years if not decades.⁹⁹ Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister, explained:

We did not agree on whether the reasons were actually sufficient, on what consequences the war would have for the fight against international terrorism and for regional stability and on whether the consequences of the war were controllable.¹⁰⁰

The European response to the war on terrorism and approach to the Iraqi campaign was a reflexive insistence on the primacy of international law. There was a broad agreement that the law of war need to be changed.¹⁰¹ Likewise, the Europeans tended to view the U.S. national security strategy as a broad attack on global rules and institutions applying power as a potentially destabilizing factor. They believed that Western ideas were best guaranteed by clear rules of behavior, represented by international law—military power destabilized the system by inciting fear and insecurity, and thus undermining the global community's confidence in peaceful cooperation.¹⁰²

In addition, some Europeans (France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg) initiated a counterweight to the United States. They wanted to create a new EU military headquarters despite the fact that "Berlin Plus" guaranteed that the European Union would be helped by NATO to develop its own strength and unity as a defensive and security force. Simply, they sought to duplicate what Europeans and Americans had built over five decades. America absolutely rejected this aspiration and stressed its will to maintain an alliance and partnership in one transatlantic relationship.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ Robert Hunter, "How Deep an Ocean?" *Newsday*, 23 February 2003, RAND Corporation, available at: <<http://www.rand.org/commentary/022303ND.html>>, accessed 5 January 2004.

¹⁰⁰ Joschka Fischer, "Europe and the Future of the Transatlantic Relations," Speech by German Foreign Minister at Princeton University, 19 November 2003, Council on Foreign Relations, available at: <http://www.cfr.org/reg_index.php?id=5||1>, accessed 11 January 2004.

¹⁰¹ G. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81 (September/October 2002); and Gary Hart, "In Search of National Security in the 21st Century," speech given at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, Jan. 21, 2003.

¹⁰² Tomas Valasek, "New Threats, New Rules: Revisiting the Law of War," Center for Defense Information, 1 May 2003, available at <<http://www.cdi.org/iraq/newthreats-newrules.cfm>>, accessed 18 December 2003.

¹⁰³ R. Nicholas Burns, "The New NATO and the Greater Middle East," U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Remarks at Conference on NATO and the Greater Middle East, Prague, 19 October 2003, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/usa/ambassador/2003/s031019a.htm>>, accessed 12 February 2004.

Americans always observed with distrust an intensive debate in Europe about security issues. A concept prevailed that the EU was a troubled and troubling union: troubled in terms of its internal divisions, and troubling in terms of the motivation that seemed to underline the actions of its older members. As an example, Robert Kagan claimed that Americans perceived Europeans as so focused on the EU current institutional agenda that they failed to see imminent threats accordingly.¹⁰⁴ If Europe had produced a serious security strategy earlier, it would have given the European Union far greater leverage and credibility.¹⁰⁵

Europe finally agreed on the nature and scale of threats to the continent after delaying to define its own foreign-policy strategy following September 11 events. However, there are some fundamental structural shortcomings, namely the process of forming political will, institutional implementation, and military capabilities in the European Common Foreign and Security Policy. There are also some fears that the increasing institutionalization of the European Security and Defense Policy will lead to duplication and will even weaken NATO.¹⁰⁶

Anyway, the U.S. retains global security interests, and Europe remains evidently a continent of much diversity with some countries pursuing their traditional and habitual ways. Seeing that, some Americans viewed NATO as a fading organization with a blocking minority of members who were not only unwilling but also broadly incapable and frankly irrelevant.¹⁰⁷ As the U.S. military moved toward rapid, fundamental, transformation of its combat capabilities, its European allies committed less resource for creating change. Moreover other factors hindered their defense development.

Above all, the security and prosperity of the rest of the world have depended on the transatlantic cooperation and vice versa. Also, this security and prosperity have been

¹⁰⁴ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2003), p. 4-5.

¹⁰⁵ G. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81 (September/October 2002); and Gary Hart, "In Search of National Security in the 21st Century," speech given at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, Jan. 21, 2003.

¹⁰⁶ Joschka Fischer.

¹⁰⁷ Simon Serfaty, "EU-U.S. Relations beyond Iraq: Setting the Terms of Complementarity," *Euro-Focus*, Volume 9, Number 3, 11 April 2003, available at: <www.csis.org/europe>, accessed 11 January 2004.

impeded by transatlantic discord. Therefore, the only way to keep the transatlantic partnership from sliding into irrelevance is for Europe to become a serious partner of America. Likewise, the leaders of France and Germany have called for an agreement to end the wrangling over the EU constitution by the end of June 2004.¹⁰⁸

In the coming years, the fight against international terrorism will remain the key point on the West's security agenda. But, the main danger will not come from extremists with dirty nuclear devices. The main problem will be if "the West" as a cohesive bloc and single-minded political force ceases to exist. Thus, the current debates of a "transatlantic community of values," the ideas that originated during the 20th century are still vividly sound concerns. In this regard, Joschka Fischer said:

We can only have stable transatlantic relations if the two pillars of this bridge across the North Atlantic are able to bear more or less the same burden Not a strong European pillar but a weak one would pose a threat to NATO. And only a strong European pillar can guarantee Europe's partnership in the transatlantic alliance.¹⁰⁹

By the same token, NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated:

it is time to put the differences of the past behind us. It is time to get back to business. The transatlantic community has realised that we have no more time to waste. That there are simply too many threats on the horizon, too many challenges for us to tackle. Terrorism, the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are confronting us with new and unprecedented strategic environment. Transatlantic cooperation is the most effective way to meet these challenges. Open security dialogue among likeminded Allies, and profound security cooperation in the framework of NATO are the best ways to balance the burden of getting the job done and to get the best bang for our buck.¹¹⁰

To sum, the differences that split the Alliance in 2003 were profound and NATO's future was at a turning point. However, disagreements among Allies are normal, and they are part of the mutual relationship. NATO has survived every crisis by adapting to changing times and it remains flexible to sustain different points of view.

¹⁰⁸ NATO Enlargement Daily Brief (NEDB), 10 February 2004.

¹⁰⁹ Joschka Fischer

¹¹⁰ NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Munich Security Conference, 7 February 2004, NATODOC, available at: <<http://listserv.cc.kuleuven.ac.be/cgi-bin/wa?A1=ind0402&L=natodata>>, accessed 10 February 2004.

Europeans and North Americans are still the most like-minded peoples on the planet in how they view the world, how they organize politically as democracies, and how they see current and future threats. Terrorism and WMD, international crime, narcotics flows, human trafficking, global climate change, AIDS and others—these are the challenges they must be faced on a multilateral basis through international cooperation. That is the reason NATO will continue to remain purposeful.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ Nicholas R. Burns, “NATO and the Future of Trans-Atlantic Relations,” Remarks by U.S. NATO Ambassador at Wilton Park, Surrey, United Kingdom, 9 February 2004, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/usa/2004/u040209a.htm>>, accessed 15 February 2004.

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IV. NATO'S CURRENT ROLE AND SECURITY INTEREST

The continuing interest of all the Allies consists in sustaining NATO and adapting it to the new strategic environment. So, the goal of this chapter is to provide a review of the Alliance's main role and stress the fact that NATO had to accept a new conceptual foundation and undergo a resolute change.

Today, the Alliance is a major security organization and transatlantic allies are not only international aid and developmental assistance donors throughout the world, but they also play leading roles in the major world institutions and in developing the tools needed to shape the international community. Furthermore, the U.S. leadership on European security issues not only shapes allied views toward a consensus on the main defense issues, it also facilitates cooperation and gives the U.S. leverage in other important forums.¹¹²

NATO remains fundamentally focused on meeting the security commitments outlined in its founding document, the Washington Treaty. Stephen Hadley, U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser, stated:

NATO's core mission is the same today as it was at its founding: collective defense and consultation about threats to peace and security. NATO put this mission into new practice following the 11 September terrorist attacks Article 5 of the NATO Treaty became real that day in a new way, and one that should surely give pause to those who question NATO's purposes. NATO's core mission has not changed. What has changed is the source of the threats to our countries.¹¹³

NATO can only successfully counter these new threats if the transatlantic allies create a long-term plan to tackle this strategic task together, on the basis of their common values, interests and the successful transatlantic tradition of the last few decades. In this context, Joschka Fisher declared:

¹¹² United States security strategy for Europe and NATO, Office of International Security Affairs, June 1995, p.3-4, available at: <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com/ciuniv/printdoc>>.

¹¹³ S. Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, "Challenge and Change for NATO. A U.S. Perspective," 3 October 2002; available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021003e.htm>>, accessed 12 February 2004.

Here lies the common transatlantic interest and the necessity for a new NATO in the 21st century. NATO will remain one of the key cornerstones for peace and stability Europe and America depend upon each other in their fight against the new threat. We are in the same boat because we want to defend the same thing: the freedom and security of our citizens, as well as our open democracies and human rights. These are the goals which we are both pursuing. These are the values which we share.¹¹⁴

Indeed, America's and Europe's common values and interests in combating terrorism, in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, in supporting economic growth and global stability, and moreover, in combating endemic disease, and in preventing failed states and regional conflicts have never been more closely aligned.¹¹⁵ Then, NATO is a central security pillar of transatlantic security, the guarantor of European stability, a mechanism for American engagement in Europe and also for dampening American and also European isolationist sentiments.¹¹⁶

A. NATO SECURITY TASKS AND OBJECTIVES

NATO is a collective defense system. As cited in the NATO's basic document, "NATO's essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and the principles of the United Nations Charter."¹¹⁷

The fundamental principle underpinning the Alliance is a common commitment to mutual cooperation among the member states, based on the indivisibility of their security. Solidarity and cohesion within the Alliance ensure that no member country is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them to realise their essential national security objectives through collective effort. In short, the Alliance is an association of free states united in their

¹¹⁴ Joschka Fischer, "Europe and the Future of the Transatlantic Relations," Speech by German Foreign Minister at Princeton University, 19 November 2003, Council on Foreign Relations, available at: <http://www.cfr.org/reg_index.php?id=5||1>, accessed 11 January 2004.

¹¹⁵ The Significance of the Transatlantic Partnership: An American Perspective, The Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 15 September 2003, available at: <<http://www.hagel.senate.gov/Press/pressapp/report/report.cfm?id=211634>>.

¹¹⁶ Richard L. Russel, "The American National Interest in Europe," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1995, Vol. 23, No.3, p. 11.

¹¹⁷ *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), p. 30.

determination to preserve their security through mutual guarantees and stable relations with other countries.¹¹⁸

NATO provides one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes. To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance serves, “as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.”¹¹⁹ To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any member state declares Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty, which contributes to effective conflict prevention and crisis management solution, including crisis response operations. Additionally, an important factor increasing transparency and mutual confidence represents a wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area.¹²⁰

The other aspect of the NATO’s significance is much related to economic and trade ties. Secured by NATO’s protective umbrella, trade works in favor of the strong partnership between the U.S. and Europe and totals over \$1 billion daily.¹²¹ In this vein, the President of the European Commission stressed “how deeply intertwined the European Union and the United States actually are. Together the US and the EU command almost 40% of world trade, which underlines the scale of our joint responsibility for the world economy.”¹²²

Following military operations in Afghanistan and cooperation with Russia, NATO was observed as becoming more of a political organization. According to Stanley Sloan,

¹¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 30-31.

¹¹⁹ *Washington Summit Communiqué*, North Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C., 24 April 1999, Press Release NAC-S(99)64, par. 6.

¹²⁰ North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 7 November 1991, par. 21.

¹²¹ Michèle A. Floutnou, “QDR 2001 Strategy–Driven Choices for America’s Security,” National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., 2001.

¹²² Romano Prodi, “Looking ahead in Transatlantic Relations,” Dinner at Rayburn House with German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, 24 June 2003, available at: <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECH/03/322|0|RAPID&lg=EN&display=>>.

“NATO has been and always will be a political as well as a military alliance.”¹²³ NATO’s activities make clear that its role is as an instrument of both political and military cooperation consisting in consultations in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and its subordinate bodies, practical coordination in the Military Committee, and day-to-day collaboration in the Integrated Command Structures.¹²⁴

David Yost noted, “The most serious dilemmas and risk reside in the Alliance’s attempt to combine elements of collective security with collective defense.”¹²⁵ Yost said

In the debate over NATO’s new functions, some conceptual obscurity has emerged at times. As is customary, Secretary of Defense Cohen used the expression “collective defense” in his April 1997 testimony to refer to the defense of the Allies against external threats. However, he used the expression “cooperative security” to refer to efforts to support the “stability of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe,” and at another point he alluded to “collective security”: “NATO’s basic principles of democracy, consensus and collective security are not a threat to Russia.”¹²⁶

In order to distinguish whether NATO is a system of collective defense or collective security, Sloan argues that NATO was designed as a system of cooperation to deal with challenges and problems originating outside that system, not within it, and it does not have legal responsibility for collective security in Europe—the North Atlantic Treaty does not suggest such a role. In fact, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)¹²⁷ was designed to promote peaceful relations among states as the 1975 Helsinki Final Act established principles to govern relations among states in Europe. Thus, according to Sloan, NATO is not a collective security organization because

it is designed primarily not to keep peace among its members but rather to protect and advance the interests of the members in dealing with the world around them. But some of NATO’s activities contribute to the goal of

¹²³ Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered*, (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), p. 6.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security*, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 163.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 164.

¹²⁷ European states plus the United States and Canada.

collective security, helping maintain peaceful and cooperative relations among all states in Europe.¹²⁸

In fact, NATO now is engaged in a system based on cooperative security. NATO has used the anti-terrorism campaign to strengthen ties with partners within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Program (EAPC), and with Russia. Consequently, giving Russia more influence in the NAC and enlarging NATO with seven other countries is altering the nature and role of the Alliance from a classic, transatlantic, collective defense organization, to something of a different quality.¹²⁹

B. NATO IS UP TO THE CHALLENGE

Among all the consequences, the divide between the external and internal dimensions of security has been transformed. Richard Lugar, the U.S. Senator, speaking in Brussels, characterized a primary objective of security cooperation to help create favorable defense:

The threat we face is global and existential. We need allies and alliances to confront it effectively. Those alliances can no longer be circumscribed by artificial geographic boundaries. All of America's alliances are going to be reviewed and recast in light of this new challenge, including NATO. If NATO is not up to the challenge of becoming effective in the new war against terrorism, then our political leaders may be inclined to search for something else that will answer this need.¹³⁰

Despite the fact that NATO is the most institutionalized alliance with experience in fostering close ties among its members, the United States chose not to use NATO to organize its alarm response to the September 11 attacks. The response occurred primarily on a bilateral, and not a multilateral, basis. Moreover, NATO was unable to provide substantial capabilities that would override U.S. concerns about using the NATO machinery. Therefore the U.S. decided to retain sole command authority in Afghanistan.

The frustration among the Allies about the U.S. unilateral intervention to Afghanistan was soon replaced by determination to transform NATO. Giving the United

¹²⁸ Stanley R. Sloan, p. 10.

¹²⁹ Peter van Ham and Richard L. Kugler, "Western Unity and Transatlantic Security Challenge," *The Marshal Center Papers*, No. 4, 2002, pp.18-19.

¹³⁰ Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-Indiana), speech in Brussels, 18 January 2002, available at <<http://www.senate.gov/-lugar/011702.html>>, accessed 18 May 2002.

States unconditional political support through the invocation of Article 5, the allies conceived that NATO's model of an enemy by the Cold War scenario and old procedures did not fit the new circumstances. Then, Lord Robertson declared that terrorism would be the key security challenge in the 21st century:

Since terrorism is global in nature, NATO's response must be global as well. NATO and its members must expand its responsibility as an essential platform for defence cooperation to become the primary means for developing the role of armed forces in helping to defeat the terrorist threat.¹³¹

He further identified four areas where NATO could play such a role: 1) in the timely identification and detection of terrorist threats; 2) in the protection of civilian and military infrastructure and populations; 3) in the management of the consequences of possible future terrorist attacks; and 4) by preparing for preemptive military action. Lord Robertson stressed that, "Military strikes against terrorists and their networks are often the only effective option to prevent further damage."¹³² The U.S. military action in Afghanistan proved this point for NATO to emulate.¹³³

Likewise, General Klaus Naumann, the former chairman of NATO's Military Committee, warned that NATO was in danger of outliving its utility, unless urgent steps were taken to revitalize the Alliance:

The problem is the apparent transatlantic divergence in perceptions of NATO. European Allies see NATO as a collective-defence and crisis-management organisation, whereas the United States, its most powerful and indeed indispensable member, no longer looks at the Alliance as the military instrument of choice to use in conflict and war If NATO were to become an essentially political organisation and no longer be used in a crisis, its defence guarantee would look hollow and it would soon lose support and fade away. This would not only be disastrous for Europe but a severe blow to US national interests as well. The United States would risk

¹³¹ NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, "NATO-Russia Cooperation in Combating Terrorism: A Good Idea Whose Time has Come, keynote address to NATO Defense College, Rome, 4 February 2002 in Peter van Ham and Richard L. Kugler, "Western Unity and Transatlantic Security Challenge," *The Marshal Center Papers*, No. 4, 2002, pp.18.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Peter van Ham and Richard L. Kugler, "Western Unity and Transatlantic Security Challenge," *The Marshal Center Papers*, No. 4, 2002, pp.18.

losing control of one of its opposing coastlines and relinquishing one of its most powerful instruments of political influence on Europe.¹³⁴

General Naumann's observation resulted in determination that NATO had to be transformed into a global Alliance, ready to defend its member countries' interests wherever they were at risk and able to act as the core of future ad hoc coalitions of the willing. Command and force structures would need to be adapted accordingly and the necessary capabilities acquired. Deployability and mobility should have been the guiding principles for adapting NATO's command structure, which should have included establishing at least two Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), enabling assets to be pooled, and setting up multinational component forces. Modernization efforts should have focused on improving capabilities that were crucial for the operational readiness of the CJTFs. Other key areas were that of command, control, communications and computing, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) around which all other capabilities necessary to implement the revolution in military affairs could have been built.¹³⁵

All in all, the Alliance obtained a task with the responsibility to continue broadening its focus beyond members' territory to address the instability and threats posed by terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles—in North Africa and the Middle East and beyond, if the situation required it. Seeking new ways to organize itself in a new system, NATO recognized needs to be able, at short notice, to deploy flexible, well-armed forces capable of conducting sustained operations across a range of military operations. In this context, the U.S. President George W. Bush said that NATO “must have the will and the capacity to act beyond Europe where threats emerge,”¹³⁶

¹³⁴ General Klaus Naumann, “Crunch Time for the Alliance,” *NATO Review* 2002/2, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue2/english/art3.html>>, accessed 15 May 2003.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ George W. Bush, in a speech during his state visit to the United Kingdom, 19 November 2003, Council on Foreign Relations, available at: <http://www.cfr.org/reg_index.php?id=5||1>, accessed 10 February 2004.

1. Conducting Out-of-Area Operations

Permanent debates concerning the out-of-area mandate have existed since the NATO's birth. Practically, out-of-area security concerns had been at the center of NATO policy as its involvement, in terms of intelligence, evaluation, consultation, coordination, and cooperation, deterred Soviet aggression against the territory of its members. According to Elizabeth Sherwood,

Paradoxically, because of its effectiveness within the European theater, most of the major crises bearing on the interests of the Atlantic allies have taken place beyond Europe. There has never been a proverbial golden moment when NATO was insulated from developments outside its boundaries or from the interests of its individual members in those developments. As a result, alongside the NATO ... is a shadow alliance, an informal, globally oriented partnership of Western nations. This shadow alliance has played a critical role in protecting the allies' global interests.¹³⁷

Indeed, the out-of-area dimension of alliance politics has been documented by several examples of fractious disputes over Indochina (1949-54), Suez (1956), North Africa (1954-62), Portuguese Africa (1961-75), Vietnam (the mid-1960s), and Libya (1986). Ian Thomas mentioned, "Though out-of-area concerns had been of great importance since NATO's founding, the term 'out-of-area' formally entered the alliance lexicon only in 1980."¹³⁸ At issue was the geographic reach of the alliance, pre-conditionality of membership, the right of imperial domain, and false expectations.

NATO members attempted to bridge disagreements over geographic boundaries by attempting to cast the menace in global terms:

Concern about the global nature of the Soviet threat contributed to the decision by the signatory governments to include in the final treaty a clause of the treaty, which clearly stipulates the boundaries of the alliance, and Article 4, which commits the signatory governments to consultation whenever the 'territorial integrity, political independence, of any of the parties is threatened' ...¹³⁹

¹³⁷ Elizabeth D. Sherwood, *Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security*, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 1.

¹³⁸ Ian Q. R. Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination*, (Boston: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 1997), p. 128.

¹³⁹ Douglas Stuart and William Tow, *The limits of Alliance: NATO Out-of-Area Problems Since 1949*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 96..

There is a whole gamut. Actions taken in out-of-area crises have often ranged from consensual statements of moral support to polite but benign neglect. Perhaps the most glaring example was the April 1986 decision taken by the U.S. Government to initiate retaliatory military measures against Libya for its terror attacks on American troops stationed in Germany.¹⁴⁰

NATO's out-of-area management emerged repeatedly and in different permutations. Three factors shaped the Alliance politics beyond Europe: "competing definitions of allied out-of-area interests, divergent views about the appropriate allocation of human and material resources, and marked inequalities in the distribution of power within NATO."¹⁴¹

Those allies with interests at stake outside Europe attempted to identify their own concerns with those of the alliance. However, NATO's principal powers—the U.S., United Kingdom, and France—carefully guarded their independence refusing to be bound by the other NATO partners' commitments. Therefore, the allies were

interested in cooperation if it was tantamount to support for their national policies, but not if joint action would constrain their chosen course. This put a damper on efforts to formalize allied obligations beyond the treaty area and forced the allies to rely on alternative means of policy coordination outside Europe.¹⁴²

Nevertheless, periodic attempts to solve the out-of-area problem existed to formalize allied cooperation by expanding NATO's domain or creating new forums for consultation and policy coordination. In fact, NATO avoided formal cooperation beyond Europe,

fearing that it would overburden the partnership and unnecessarily limit the autonomy of its members. Instead, the allies have relied on an ad hoc, informal approach to the management of developments outside the treaty area. The organizing principle has been that members with the interest, the will, and the capability to take action beyond Europe in defense of Western interests should do so, and that, where possible, they should coordinate with one another. Most often, this kind of cooperation has

¹⁴⁰ William D. Wharton, *Security Arrangements for a New Europe*, The Fourteenth NATO Symposium Spring 1991, (Washington, National Defense University Press, 1992), p. 96.

¹⁴¹ Elizabeth D. Sherwood, p. 2.

¹⁴² Ibid.

taken place on a bilateral basis outside the NATO framework. The nonbinding nature of this arrangement has given the Atlantic alliance the flexibility necessary to manage a wide variety of global challenges to the interests of its members and, ultimately, to endure.¹⁴³

In the late 1990s, when questioned on the legality of the out-of-area mandate Tony Lloyd, the British Secretary of State said that NATO considered each operation on a case-by-case basis. He added that a UN mandate would not be needed in every instance. However, it was inconceivable that NATO would break international law. Therefore, at the time the British Defense Minister George Robertson stated that non-Article 5 missions needed to be incorporated into the revised NATO strategic concept. He drew on the example of Bosnia and Kosovo to demonstrate this as a “pragmatic role that has a legal mandate.” However, he emphasized that Article 5 must remain at the core of the concept. He added that possible legal bases for military action would be the UN Charter, UN Security Council Resolutions and the OSCE mandate.¹⁴⁴

Article 6 of the Treaty precisely and explicitly limits the scope of allied action. However, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept of 1999 foresaw that “Military capabilities ... are also the basis of the Alliance’s ability to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management through non-Article 5 crisis response operations.”¹⁴⁵

The primary role of Alliance military forces is to protect peace and to guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of member states. The Alliance’s forces must therefore be able to deter and defend effectively, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and—in case of conflict—to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. NATO forces must maintain the ability to provide for collective defence while conducting effective non-Article 5 crisis response operations.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁴⁴ Thomas Neve, “UK Clarifies 'Out-of-Area' Mandate,” 24 February 1999, available at: <<http://www.basicint.org/europe/NATO/99summit/1-3.htm>>, accessed 17 May 2003.

¹⁴⁵ *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. 23-24 April 1999, 24 April 1999, Press Release NAC-S(99)65, par. 29, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>>.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., par. 47.

The Alliance's Strategic Concept of 1999 thus confirmed the out-of-area role through the non-Article 5 crisis response operations as a contribution to some collective defense missions.¹⁴⁷

The NATO's Balkan missions, the most intense and sustained military operations in Europe since World War II, represented the first extended use of force by NATO as well as the first major combat operations conducted for humanitarian objectives. "For the first time in history, NATO today is operating beyond its borders in support of crisis management and peacekeeping. We have abolished the old distinction between in-area and out-of-area,"¹⁴⁸ said NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner in October 1993. He echoed the sentiments of those like U.S. Senator Richard Lugar of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who called for NATO to go "out-of-area or out-of-business."

The trends toward out-of-area issue reflected NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson while examining the significance of the Prague Summit 2002 and considering the challenges ahead:

First of all, we have reached agreement on the character of the new threats and on the best way that NATO and its members should respond to them. Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are two of the defining challenges of the 21st century. The NATO Allies acknowledged this by invoking Article 5 in response to the 9/11 attacks. And they did so again by sending forces to Afghanistan to fight al Qaida and the Taliban. As a result, in 2002, we effectively buried the perennial debate on whether NATO could or should go "out-of-area."¹⁴⁹

Certainly, NATO operations, such as IFOR, SFOR, and KFOR were tests for out-of-area and non-Article 5 missions and they were watershed events for NATO in the post-Cold War era. As a matter of fact, it was the lesson of September 11 that the gravest threats could come from anywhere on the globe. NATO's reactions were thus the defense of peace not just in Europe but wherever threats arose. In fact, in August 2003 NATO

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., par. 49.

¹⁴⁸ NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner, "NATO: A Changing Alliance for a Changing World," speech to Foreign Policy Association, New York, 7 October 1993.

¹⁴⁹ Secretary-General Lord Robertson, "Transforming NATO," *NATO Review*, Spring 2003, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue1/english/art1.html>>, accessed 11 November 2003.

officially assumed the command, coordination, and planning of the real out-of-area mission—the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operating in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁰

Then, NATO now operating well beyond the borders of member states definitely responded to the permanent debate of “out-of-area” issue. No wonder NATO began the global aspiration to be a model for the new global security architecture.

2. NATO’s Current Operations and Lessons Learned

The Balkans lessons helped NATO recognize its weaknesses and established its virtue ahead. Now, the time has come to replace NATO troops in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia by an EU mission, but Kosovo and the Balkans as a whole still need the stabilizing presence of NATO. Especially in Kosovo, NATO conducts a broad range of essential peacekeeping duties largely on its own.¹⁵¹

The political basis for the Alliance’s role in the former Yugoslavia was established at the NAC meeting in Oslo, June 1992. NATO announced the readiness to support, on a case-by-case basis, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of OSCE.¹⁵² After the ethnic cleansing and other atrocities developed in Kosovo, it became evident that NATO’s failure to end a brutal war had a profound impact on both, the alliance’s viability and the credibility of the United States. The NAC meeting thus stated:

The crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values for which NATO has stood since its foundation: democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It is the culmination of a deliberate policy of oppression, ethnic cleansing and violence pursued by the Belgrade regime under the

¹⁵⁰ R. Nicholas Burns, Statement On the Future of NATO to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Statement by U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Brussels, 1 April 2003, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/usa/ambassador/2003/s030401a.htm>>, accessed 12 February 2004.

¹⁵¹ NATO Enlargement Daily Brief (NEDB), “NATO is Facing New Tasks,” Text of NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer guest commentary by German newspaper Bild am Sonntag, 18 January 2004, available at: <<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/nedb>>, accessed 20 January 2004.

¹⁵² NATO Handbook, “The Process of Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia,” available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0501.htm>>.

direction of President Milosevic. We will not allow this campaign of terror to succeed. NATO is determined to prevail.¹⁵³

The conflict in Kosovo and action taken by NATO thereafter generated plenty of questions and opened a new period in international relations. Legitimate criticism of how the campaign was conducted—too great a US and too small a European contribution—dominated the public image so much that the most important issue was almost lost in the debate.¹⁵⁴ As the air campaign brought about some disillusion, the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson asserted:

NATO launched its airpower to end the repression in Kosovo—and succeeded. In the blizzard of words that has followed it is easy to overlook that simple fact. Much is still misunderstood about what happened. Now is an appropriate time to look back on what NATO did during the conflict, to review what KFOR has achieved since, and to look ahead. The risks were high—NATO faced many problems—and the price was high. But as the Alliance promised at the time, Serb forces are out, KFOR is in, and the refugees are home. However, there should be no illusions—the task remaining is formidable.¹⁵⁵

In fact, General Wesley Clark said:

In the darkest days before the NATO 50th anniversary summit in late April in Washington, British Prime Minister Tony Blair came to our headquarters in Belgium on very short notice. To be honest, it wasn't altogether clear why he was coming. But as he and I sat alone in my office, it quickly became apparent. "Are we going to win?" he asked me. "Will we win with an air campaign alone? Will you get ground troops if you need them?" Blair made it very clear that the future of every government in Western Europe, including his own, depended on a successful outcome of the war. Therefore, he was going to do everything it took to succeed. That was the real lesson of the Kosovo campaign at the highest level: NATO worked.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵³ North Atlantic Council, "Statement on Kosovo," Heads of State and Government participating in the NAC meeting, Washington, D.C., 23 - 24 April 1999, Press Release S-1(99)62, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-062e.htm>>, accessed 18 May 2003.

¹⁵⁴ Günther Altenburg, "Plus ça change," NATO Review 2002/2, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue2/english/art1.html>>, accessed 15 May 2003.

¹⁵⁵ Lord Robertson, "Kosovo One Year on Achievement and Challenge," 21 March 2000, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/repo2000/intro.htm>>, accessed 12 May 2003.

¹⁵⁶ General Wesley Clark, "An Army of One?" *San Antonio Current*, 29 August to 4 September 2002, pp. 10-12.

If NATO is to continue to play a constructive role in the effort to bring enduring peace to the Balkans, two important lessons from the Balkan tragedy must be heeded. First, the early hesitation of the Allies to act in response to the crisis on Bosnia cost many lives in Yugoslavia and probably has cost the Allies much more financially and militarily than the earlier political-military intervention would have. Second, the experience in Kosovo suggests that NATO should only threaten military intervention when the Allies are willing and clearly prepared to fulfill those threats. Empty threats only undermine the effectiveness of NATO's policies and, more broadly, the long-term credibility of the Alliance.

The results from the Kosovo campaign made it painfully clear that Europe depended upon American military capabilities. However, it also underlined that the U.S. leadership in Europe was tenuous and that most Americans were unwilling to risk messy European conflicts in which their national interests were hardly at stake. The lesson for Europeans was evident: the United States remained crucial for the maintenance of the continent as long as Europe lacked the willingness to assume more responsibility for its own defense. The lesson of Kosovo, therefore, stimulated a rethinking of European defense cooperation.¹⁵⁷

NATO after Kosovo faced the challenge to reorganize and re-equip its forces to make them more flexible, more mobile and more effective. Additionally, Kosovo marked a turning point for Europe acknowledging that violence and conflict were no longer acceptable in the new Europe and beyond its periphery.¹⁵⁸

On the other hand, the Kosovo air campaign undertaken without UN authorization affected the stage for the American doctrine of "preemption." In a sense, this level of agreement within the UN (all available means) was generally supportive of the initial American response to the September 11 attacks, acquiescing in the initiation of the Afghanistan campaign. The NATO air campaign also represented a beginning of the

¹⁵⁷ Peter van Ham, *Europe's New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia*, George C. Marshall Center, 2001, pp. 8-9.

¹⁵⁸ Lauren Van Metre, "Transatlantic Relations in the Aftermath of Kosovo," 15 May 2000, United States Institute of Peace, Special report 59, available at: <mhtml:file://H:\New%20Folder\Transatlantic%20Relations%20In%20the%20Aftermath%20of%20>, accessed 5 February 2004.

future face of war—the long-distance, high-tech application of force served as an attractive template as the United States and other nations become ever more casualty-averse.

Indeed, the Kosovo air campaign was the first major operation in which aircraft achieved victory without the need for a land campaign. It really encouraged airpower enthusiasts for sophisticated air attacks and encouraged militaries to implement other steps in RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs). NATO's commander for Europe, General James Jones said that Kosovo was a “test-bed” of reforms designed to make the Atlantic alliance smarter and more flexible.¹⁵⁹

Nowadays, NATO is planning to reduce the number¹⁶⁰ of peacekeepers securing Kosovo. The new unit, Multinational Task Force, will focus on intelligence-based operations and rely on more mobile troops to secure the region. “The methods will be different and they will involve intelligence-led operations, greater flexibility and mobility,” said Brannstrom, the brigadier general in charge.

Following the Operation Enduring Freedom (the US-led coalition fighting the war on terrorism) and the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan, NATO in August 2003 took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)¹⁶¹ in Kabul. The ISAF operation is linked to the most important issues facing NATO today: transformation, enlargement, terrorism, and burden sharing. ISAF serves as a test of NATO's ability and capability to live up to the promises of the Prague Summit of November 2002 when NATO resolved to meet “the grave new threats and profound security challenges of the 21st century to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed ... to sustain operations over distance and time ... and to achieve their objectives.”¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹ NATO Enlargement Daily Brief (NEDB), 10 February 2004.

¹⁶⁰ Close to 19,000 troops serve with NATO in Kosovo. Their numbers have more than halved from the 50,000 troops initially deployed in 1999.

¹⁶¹ ISAF was established under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, UN Security Council Resolution 1386, and in accordance with the Bonn Agreement of 6 December 2001, which called for establishing the Afghan Interim Authority, and the Afghan Transitional Administration to govern the country in place of the ousted Taliban regime temporarily.

¹⁶² *Prague Summit Declaration*, par. 1, 3, 4, 21 November 2002, Press Release(2002)127, available at: < <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>>, accessed 12 May 2003.

ISAF is a milestone for NATO because it tests the NATO's ability to function without the U.S. major assistance. NATO's ability to follow through on the mission, its first outside of Europe, has become a crucial test for the alliance. Although the United States is still financing a substantial portion of the ISAF costs, European countries lead and provide the majority of the manpower and assess the coordination mechanisms between NATO and the EU.

The importance of ISAF's success stressed Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General. He expressed concerns that those who want to win the anti-terror war must not lose Afghanistan. The solution is to extend the NATO presence beyond the capital, Kabul, both politically and militarily.¹⁶³ "NATO's first priority is to get Afghanistan right," ¹⁶⁴ said Scheffer. Expanding beyond the capital is crucial not only to provide greater security in the provinces but also to extend the authority of the Afghan government. However, NATO has had difficulty mustering enough troops and equipment from member nations to fulfill this commitment. While U.S. forces are concentrated in southern and eastern Afghanistan where Taliban and al Qaeda fighters remain a threat, plans call for the NATO teams to move into the relatively calm north and west.¹⁶⁵

The risk to ISAF represents the over-commitment as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is now responsible for the command, control, coordination, and planning additionally for SFOR, KFOR. In addition, NATO member nations are involved in a number of smaller scale operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and the war on terrorism. A successful ISAF mission—minimal casualties, few integration problems among participating nations, and no last minute American help— would surely yield several important benefits for NATO.

The ISAF mission bears virtually no resemblance to NATO's operations in the Balkans. Whereas the mission of IFOR, and subsequently SFOR and KFOR, required NATO troops to separate warring factions and to implement the General Framework Agreement (the Dayton Peace Accords), the ISAF mission by contrast is focused

¹⁶³ NATO Enlargement Daily Brief (NEDB), "NATO is Facing New Tasks," Text of NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer guest commentary by German newspaper *Bild am Sonntag*, 18 January 2004, available at: <<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/nedb>>, accessed 20 January 2004.

¹⁶⁴ NATO Enlargement Daily Brief (NEDB), 09 February 2004.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

primarily on providing security for UN operations in Kabul. ISAF also speaks for the testing of the strategic airlift and force projection capabilities as the area of operation is the most distant NATO out-of-area operation. Despite these differences, the two missions are indicative of what NATO must be prepared to execute next. Future scenarios will require expeditionary forces to operate in semi-permissive environments for extended durations to provide security for humanitarian and civil-military cooperation.

First and foremost, a successful ISAF could portray the vision of a transformed Alliance as forecast at the NATO Prague Summit. Moreover, it is the first real out-of-area mission and the first operational mission to integrate new member states plus a few potential member states. Successfully executing the ISAF without a substantial U.S. involvement may help diminish the burden-sharing debate. To the European benefit, it could be proof that they have learned the lessons of Kosovo and are now actively engaged outside Europe.

C. REVISITING NATO'S ROLE

After the Balkans' lessons, it became clear that NATO had to be shaped into an effective multilateral military instrument. In this context, Giovanna Bono said:

It has been demonstrated that there were shifting 'policy communities' whose members were consistently at the forefront in seeking to give NATO an 'out-of-area' role. Although these policy-makers were partly moved by a desire to end the sufferings in the Balkans, they were simultaneously seeking to resolve complex domestic and transatlantic 'burdensharing' issues. The Alliance's role in the Balkans was therefore never purely driven by the fear of an external threat or by humanitarian concerns.¹⁶⁶

Since the events of September 11 and its aftermath, NATO has again been unintentionally entangled in a process to redefine its role in the international arena. Enlargement became the cornerstone of its new posture, which aimed to adapt to the security environment and replace its aging Cold War static defense-oriented posture with a new, more flexible one. Thus, the Allies could not have credibility throughout the Euro-Atlantic region unless NATO's effectiveness was improved. In a like manner, Lord

¹⁶⁶ Giovanna Bono, *NATO's 'Peace-Enforcement' Tasks and 'Policy Communities': 1990-1999*, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), p. 146.

Robertson, a former NATO Secretary General, stated, “NATO must change radically if it is to be effective ... It must modernize or be marginalized.”¹⁶⁷

Indeed, when the U.S. went alone in Afghanistan, it raised fears that the Alliance became marginalized. Therefore, European NATO acknowledged the need to focus on its military capabilities and a more equal partnership cooperating with the United States. However, Europeans always demanded protection under the UN framework. In context, David Yost said,

Moreover, as the Allies recognized in the Kosovo crisis, depending on the UN Security Council as the only entity capable of legitimizing an intervention in support of collective security could hamper the Alliance’s ability to act in cases in which the gravity of the injustice and the magnitude of the threat to Allied interests demand immediate action.¹⁶⁸

Evidently, the new security environment insisted not only on transforming the Alliance, but also on all interconnecting factors, structures and organizations, such as the UN. Additionally, a serious risk of a “hollowing out” of NATO appeared. The fact was provoked by the differential rates of force modernization, especially in taking full advantage of developments in high technology. The fact that tomorrow’s U.S. forces might be unable to fight in collaboration with allied forces remaining stuck at today’s technological levels horrified NATO officials.¹⁶⁹ By the same token, Lord Robertson argued in February 2002 that the

huge additional investment [the United States] is making in defence will make practical interoperability with Allies, in NATO or in coalitions, impossible. The gap between American forces on the one hand and European and Canadian forces on the other will be unbridgeable. For Washington, the choice could become: act alone or not at all. And that is no choice at all.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ Supreme Headquarters Allied Europe (SHAPE), available at: <http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nfra.htm>, accessed 10 October 2003.

¹⁶⁸ David S. Yost, “NATO’s Contributions to Conflict Management,” in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), p. 600.

¹⁶⁹ Lord Robertson, Transforming NATO: Lord Robertson Examines the Significance of the Prague Summit and Considers the Challenges Ahead, *NATO Review*, Spring 2003, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue1/english/art1.html>>, accessed 21 January 2004.

¹⁷⁰ NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, “NATO: Enlarging and Redefining Itself,” Lecture at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 18 February 2002.

Then, Robertson offered two solutions. First, European countries have to spend more on security and defense, both individually and within the ESDP. For Europe, he argued, the choice should be modernization. Second, the US government should relax the stringent export control regulations on technology transfers for its European allies, offering them at least part of the benefits of the American RMA.¹⁷¹

In fact, it was questionable whether European countries would be able and willing to catch up with the American RMA. Europe had failed to invest in the newest developments in military technology and cashed its post-Cold War peace dividends. Europe lagged behind in adapting commercial high-tech to military purposes and had not formulated and integrated a joint military strategy based on these high-tech defense capabilities. Therefore, Europe remained far removed from the US level of sophistication.¹⁷²

Speaking in Berlin on 24 June 2003, NATO Secretary General mentioned again that European NATO members were “still spending too much on cold war legacy capabilities and unnecessary prestige projects, and not enough on what really matters today.” He stressed that this could open a “growing disconnect” between what Europe’s aspirations were and what it could actually deliver.¹⁷³ Thus, he again immensely urged both to solve the capability gap and to refresh transatlantic relations.

Solving the capabilities gap and refreshing transatlantic relationship desperately meant that Europe and the U.S. had to resolve their disagreements over Iraq and other security issues. Having examined both the security and economic sides of the relationship, Europe and the U.S. had to launch a new initiative to help overcome lingering security problems, improve the close relationship by relaxing the U.S. tendency to unilateralism and the European tendency toward introversion and fragmentation. Above all, the most essential issue was noted by Joschka Fisher: “NATO will remain one of the key cornerstones for peace and stability. By the same token, however, we must

¹⁷¹ Peter van Ham and Richard L. Kugler, “Western Unity and Transatlantic Security Challenge,” *The Marshal Center Papers*, No. 4, 2002, pp.18.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Lord Robertson visits Germany, Berlin, 24 June 2003, available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/06-june/e0624a.htm>>, accessed 11 December 2003.

remember that if we split, the consequences for us all on both sides of the Atlantic will be extremely negative.”¹⁷⁴

Meeting the challenges of the 21st century, it became obvious that NATO would have to accept a new conceptual foundation and undergo a resolute change, starting with the deployment of a rapid-reaction force with global reach. “It’s obvious we’re seeing a military metamorphosis of this alliance,” said General James Jones, U.S. Marine Corps, Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces in Europe.¹⁷⁵ NATO thus had to revisit its roles in the campaign against terrorism, reconstruct its position in pre-emptive actions as well as consequence management, and promote interoperability through a new strategic concept.

In sum, the profound political changes in Europe and the growing gap resulting from the U.S. military transformation and the failure of the European armed forces to follow that transformation created a new challenge to the transatlantic security system. DCI and PCC were launched to improve NATO defense and military capabilities. The new NATO’s agenda includes widening its role in Afghanistan, Iraq, and also in the Greater Middle East.

¹⁷⁴ Joschka Fischer, “Europe and the Future of the Transatlantic Relations,” Speech by German Foreign Minister at Princeton University, 19 November 2003, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/archiv_print?archiv_id=5089, accessed 19 January 2004.

¹⁷⁵ “NATO to Change Radically, Go Global: Supreme Allied Commander,” *Defense News*, April 1, 2003, available at: http://www.defensenews.com/pgt.php?htd=i_story_1729863.html&tty=worldwide, accessed 11 January 2004.

V. NATO'S GLOBAL BUID-UP

This chapter discusses NATO's transformation from a purely transatlantic organization to a most effective international security instrument protecting peace throughout the world. Josef Joffe notes that NATO I, the anti-Soviet alliance formed in 1949, dedicated to the Three Musketeers' principle of "all for one, and one for all," had been replaced by NATO II. This new alliance is no longer the embodiment of a unilateral security guarantee by the United States to the Europeans, but a collection of nation-states. With its 26 members, "NATO II is going to look like a small United Nations,"¹⁷⁶ he said.

The Alliance's contribution to international peace confirmed its significance in the world affairs. NATO realized that the first front of the effective defense had to be abroad before crises erupt. Failing to address the new threats that are not static would only increase the danger. After permanent and unproductive out-of-area debates whether NATO should go globally, it became clear that NATO did not need to address this issue any more because NATO had been global since its establishment. Actually, the Alliance commitment to Europe created these profound global implications.

In addition, the scope of the Alliance domain was characterized by Truman in his speech during the signing ceremony. He announced, "The pact will be a positive, not a negative, influence for peace, and its influence will be felt not only in the area it specifically covers but throughout the world."¹⁷⁷ Already in the early fifties, the members' individual security and the cohesiveness of the Alliance was affected by developments outside the formal area of allied responsibility.

Since NATO cannot effectively coordinate aid programs and development activities or tackle any global problems alone, this is again the role for concerted cooperation of the "shadow alliance" to promote and protect the common interest. Therefore, the United States and Europe unified by NATO's spirit had to reinforce strategic ties with Russia, Japan, China, India and others in order, as articulated in *The North Atlantic Treaty*:

¹⁷⁶ Josef Joffe, "The Alliance Is Dead. Long Live The New Alliance," *New York Times*, 29 September 2002.

¹⁷⁷ Truman address, reprinted in *New York Times*, 5 April 1949, p. 6.

to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.¹⁷⁸

Thus, NATO has no other choice but to accept the role of a broader security guarantor acting in accordance with the international law. If the international law is not proactive to stop atrocities, NATO must develop the mechanism to act in favor of human factors. Now, due to the remaining threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the Alliance is forced to adopt a complex interconnection of political, military, economic, legal and social aspects and create the basic preconditions enabling it to fulfill its main security tasks effectively and globally.¹⁷⁹

A. FORCE TRANSFORMATION

While the essential nature of war has changed remarkably little throughout history, the conduct of war changed repeatedly in response to geopolitical, demographic and technological developments. Armies that adapted successfully to these trends won, those that failed to adapt lost, as well as the nations they defended.

From history, the military focused merely on state contra state wars. Now, the power is moving to the larger non-state system level while violence is moving downwards to the individual level. This change leads to the necessity to transform the military. Vaclav Havel, a former President of the Czech Republic, said in this context, "...responsibility is ours, we must accept it and grasp it here, now, in this place in time and space where the Lord has set us down."¹⁸⁰ Subsequently, military transformation should be a comprehensive response to threats. The objective is to achieve a full spectrum force that is well organized, manned, equipped and trained to be strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable across the

¹⁷⁸ *The North Atlantic Treaty*, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949, Article 1, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm>>, accessed 10 January 2004.

¹⁷⁹ Based on a speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Munich Security Conference, 7 February 2004.

¹⁸⁰ General Daniel Schroeder, *The Assessment of the Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic*, Vaclav Havel, a note to *The Assessment*, Section 4, 19 June 2002, available at: <<http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?pgid=103>>, accessed 15 December 2002.

entire spectrum of military operations. Transformation is often considered in terms of a revolution in military affairs—the new doctrine, organization, and technology that may change the nature of warfare. But such a revolution is just one aspect of broader global trends.

Transformation is foremost a continuing process consisting in anticipating the future and dealing with the evolution of concepts, processes, organizations, and technology. A change in any of these areas above necessitates change in all. As innovative ideas emerge, as breakthroughs in science and technology occur, as concepts prove their worth through experimentation, transformation must produce a new kind of force, a capabilities-based ground force that will dominate across a broad spectrum of operations. The overall objective of these changes is simple, sustain competitive in warfare. Admiral Cebrowski said, “This is not just about technology. It is about human behavior so we are interested in concepts of organizations as well as how they interact with each other.”¹⁸¹ The new trend line is around speed of force deployment, speed of organization, speed of employment, and speed of sustainment. The changing global environment is creating a need for forces to undertake preventive actions, rather than reacting to situations. “If you have a reactive force, the temptation is to be punitive. Rather, because of the global situation and emerging threats, we want to be much more preventive,”¹⁸² Cebrowski said.

Flexibility is a key notion in many respects such as crisis management options, defense planning, readiness states, reinforcement planning, and mobility of troops but an eye must be kept on other perceptions of what NATO is planning in this regard. Here, transparency will be of paramount importance. Mainly, nuclear strategy considerations must reflect political, war-preventing nature as nuclear weapons remain the ultimate deterrent, weapons of last resort. Apart from the changes in stockpile size and composition, it is important to see that the support of the Alliance’s nuclear strategy depends more than before on the public’s understanding. When in fact, nuclear weapons

¹⁸¹ Speech by VADM Arthur Cebrowski to The Network Centric Warfare 2003 Conference, 22 January 2003, available at: http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/trends_170_Transformation%20Trends17%20February%20Issue.pdf, accessed 9 June 2003.

¹⁸² Ibid.

cannot be disinvented as their hypothetical elimination would only lead to a destabilizing nuclear arms race in a time of tension. In contrast, other potentially irrational nuclear powers may have to be deterred because they make any armed conflict incalculable.¹⁸³

In fact, the emergence of a foe with weapons of mass destruction, which cannot be deterred by the threat of any reprisal, and the need to maintain readiness all add impetus to NATO transformation. The slow pace of progress that had been noted since the end of the Cold War and the events of September 11 convinced the Alliance that urgent steps had to be taken. NATO acknowledged the necessity to reorient itself to create deployable forces and enhanced expeditionary capabilities to deal with crises wherever they occur.¹⁸⁴

NATO's Prague Summit 2002 approved the launching of the Alliance's transformation effort, which was based on three pillars: the NATO Response Force (NRF), the new flexible and deployable command framework, and the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). The agreement was reached in light of the acknowledgement that NATO's structure was overburdened by excessive and inflexible Cold War era infrastructure: too many troops and old equipment.¹⁸⁵ General Jones—the first US Marine General who became SACEUR to reflect the Alliance's new “expeditionary” character—noted “[W]e have too much capability for the past and not enough capacity for the future.”¹⁸⁶ NATO thus recognized that modern, flexible, rapidly deployable joint, meaning sea, land and air forces are required to meet and defeat today's asymmetrical threats.¹⁸⁷

Streamlining the NATO's Military Command Structure, allies focused on “a leaner, more efficient, effective and deployable command structure, with a view to

¹⁸³ Klaus Wittmann, “NATO's Future Military Strategy” in William D. Wharton, *Security Arrangements for a New Europe*, The Fourteenth NATO Symposium Spring 1991, (Washington, National Defense University Press, 1992), p. 125.

¹⁸⁴ Brendan Wilson, “In Search of Stability: NATO's Strategic Crossroads,” *Strategic Insight*, Center for Contemporary Conflict, 1 May 2003.

¹⁸⁵ Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces in Europe (SHAPE), available at: <http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nfra.htm>, accessed 20 October 2003.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ The NATO Response Force – NRF, 12 February 2004, available at: <http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrf_intro.htm>, accessed 15 February 2004.

meeting the operational requirements for the full range of Alliance missions.”¹⁸⁸ The Alliance’s Defense Ministers agreed in June 2003 on the number of NATO’s headquarters reducing them from twenty to eleven.¹⁸⁹ This process should be completed by the summer 2004. The new NATO military structure will be based primarily on tasks and capabilities. The traditional division along geographical lines will be definitely abolished.¹⁹⁰

At the strategic level, SHAPE stationed at Mons, Belgium, commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) takes overall responsibility for the Alliance’s operations, changing its title from Allied Command Europe (ACE) to Allied Command Operations (ACO). SHAPE is henceforth responsible for all Alliance operations, including those previously undertaken by SACLANT. SACEUR (former SACEUR) will continue to be dual-hatted post while also commanding the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). The Allied Command Atlantic at Norfolk, Virginia is replaced by the Allied Command Transformation (ACT). ACT will promote the transformation of Alliance militaries and improve their ability to inter-operate, whilst enhancing the transatlantic link. Its long-term objective will be to foster change, evolution and development, providing continual improvement and advancement. Its commander, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) will be also dual-hatted being also in charge of the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). The ACT structure includes the Joint Warfare Centre in Norway, a new Joint Force Training Centre in Poland and the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Portugal. ACT headquarters is also supervising the Undersea Research Center in La Spezia, Italy, and the Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre in Greece. There will be direct linkages between ACT, NATO schools and NATO agencies, and the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM).¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁸ *Prague Summit Declaration*, 21 November 2002, par. 4 b, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>>, accessed 3 December 2003.

¹⁸⁹ In total there remain 11 headquarters: two at strategic level, three at operational level and six at component level. This is an approximate 40% reduction, (on top of the 70% reduction in the previous Command Structure review in 1999). <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/command-structure.htm>

¹⁹⁰ NATO Issues, “NATO’s New Command Structure 2003,” June 2003, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/command-structure.htm>>, accessed 18 October 2003.

¹⁹¹ NATO Issues, New NATO Command Structure, 12 June 2003, available at: <http://www.nato.int/issues/military/_structure/command/index-e.htm>, accessed 18 October 2003.

At the operational level there are two standing Joint Force Commands (JFC), and a Joint Headquarters under ACO. One JFC in Brunssum, the Netherlands, and one in Naples, Italy that can conduct operations from their static locations or provide a land-based Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters and a robust but more limited standing Joint Headquarters (JHQ), in Lisbon, Portugal, from which a deployable sea-based CJTF HQ capability can be drawn. When all these changes are completed, operational commands will no longer have an assigned area of responsibilities.¹⁹²

At the tactical level there are six component commands with land, maritime, and air elements called Joint Force Component Commands (JFCCs). For the JFC in Brunssum, the Land Component Command (LCC) is located at Heidelberg, Germany, the Maritime Component Command (MCC), at Northwood, the United Kingdom, and the Air Component Command (ACC), at Ramstein, Germany. For the JFC in Naples, the LCC is located at Madrid, Spain, the MCC in Naples, and the ACC at Izmir, Turkey. Additionally, there are four static Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOCs)—in Uedem, Germany, in Finderup, Denmark, in Poggio Renatico, Italy, and in Larissa, Greece, two of which are also deployable—in Uedem, and Poggio Renatico. CAOCs will operate strictly as coordinating cells for air operations, therefore, they will not be regarded as separate headquarters.¹⁹³ Under the new concept, NATO forces should be capable of rapid deployment to crisis areas and remain sustainable, in support of both Article 5 and Non-Article 5 operations.

In all, the new military command structure together with the formation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) has become a center-piece and an engine of change for the Alliance. In other words, the NATO's relevance, effectiveness, and future will depend on co-operation, consultation and a shared vision for the 21st Century. That is the real meaning for transforming and revitalizing the Alliance.

1. Prague Capabilities Commitment

Besides endorsing the Military Command Structure, the Prague summit reflected the prevailing security situation and brought the NATO's new capabilities initiative, the

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). It was designed to improve the Alliance's terrorism-related capabilities and ensure that allies

be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, upon decision by the North Atlantic Council, to sustain operations over distance and time, including in an environment where they might be faced with nuclear, biological and chemical threats, and to achieve their objectives.¹⁹⁴

Within a strict timeframe, the PCC has focused on progress in the following crucial areas: chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense; intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control and communications; combat effectiveness including precision guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defenses; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refueling; and deployable combat support and combat service support units.¹⁹⁵

PCC has provided for the specialization role on a voluntary basis to bridge the gap between the U.S. and European allies—no single country would cover the full range of military capabilities. “Those capabilities would be divided amongst allies with each concentrating on developing particular aspects of the total requirement.”¹⁹⁶ For example, the Czech Republic formally offered a chemical and biological warfare unit for future operations. This method should have helped smaller members to commit the appropriate money on defense. In fact, NATO took responsibility to coordinate NATO labor-division to avoid unnecessary duplication.

However, there are challenges that remain to complete the vision of the Prague summit. There has not been a strategic decision by the European allies to either increase spending on defense, or to spend differently. For example, whereas the U.S. defense

¹⁹⁴ Prague Summit Declaration, 21 November 2002, par. 4, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>>, accessed 3 December 2003.

¹⁹⁵ NATO Defense Ministers Background Briefing, “NRF-NATO’s Expeditionary Capability,” Colorado Springs, 8-9 October 2003, available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2003/10-colorado/briefing02.pdf>>, accessed 12 October 2003.

¹⁹⁶ House of Commons-Defense Committee, p 50.

budget in 2003 was \$376 billion, 18 European allies spent \$140 billion.¹⁹⁷ Nicholas Burns, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, warned:

That huge capabilities gap in spending has existed in the Alliance since 1949. It's not new. But what's new is that the premium in military capability is now with advanced technology. It costs more. So, the actual gap in capabilities is expanding greater than the defense-spending gap. That's a true crisis in the alliance.¹⁹⁸

Another issue to complete has been what Lord Robertson called a "usability gap." Despite 2.4 million NATO Europeans in uniform, only 55,000 of them today are deployed outside their countries, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, and other parts of the world. However, the threat will require long-term expeditionary missions in the future, then, the Europeans need to increase the percentage of their soldiers who are physically fit, equipped, trained and ready to go.¹⁹⁹

Above all, in Prague a new NATO was constructed with plans of a vast transformation ahead. The PCC framework initiated a bold endeavor to change radically the Alliance's military posture. That was a dramatic expansion of NATO's military capabilities to react within days, with substantial force in a crisis out-of-area. The Alliance also focused on shifting resources toward modernizing equipment. Summing up, the PCC framework improved NATO military performance and augmented NATO's role in international affairs even if some difficulties remain unsolved as mentioned above.

2. NATO Response Force

The NATO Response Force (NRF) was inaugurated on 15 October 2003 with the task to reach the initial operational capability (IOC) by October 2004, the final one (FOC) not later than October 2006.²⁰⁰ SACEUR General James L. Jones emphasized the NRF inauguration act "to be one of the most important changes in the NATO Alliance

¹⁹⁷ R. Nicholas Burns, "The New NATO and the Greater Middle East," U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Remarks at Conference on NATO and the Greater Middle East, Prague, 19 October 2003, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/usa/ambassador/2003/s031019a.htm>>, accessed 12 February 2004.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ NATO's Defence Ministers Session, Statement on Capabilities, 12 June 2003, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-066e.htm>, 15 June 2003.

since the signing of the Washington Treaty over 50 years ago.”²⁰¹ The Alliance de facto physically and fully entered the global arena: “An agile, flexible, credible NRF with a global reach will be instrumental in transforming NATO into a much stronger and more effective military alliance with world wide influence.”²⁰² This must be documented as an irreversible moment for the NATO’s history.

Hence, the NRF is an innovative military capability to meet the threats from global terrorism. Its purpose is to provide a joint combined force, which is able to deploy rapidly wherever needed and undertake the full spectrum of the Alliance’s operations. The NRF also gives NATO a strong and credible high readiness capability of preventing conflict or threat from escalating into a wider dispute.²⁰³

In other words, the NRF does not have a standing character but the expeditionary design, tailored to the needs of each specific operation. At full capability, the NRF will number up to 21,000 personnel with joint air, maritime and land components, deployable in five days and sustainable up to one month or more if it is reinforced. “Based on recent scenarios, planners consider this to be sufficient time to contain and deter a given threat and restore stability, or to signal that more robust, graduated readiness forces are required to stabilize a given situation.”²⁰⁴ The NRF will be composed of a brigade-size land element including special operations forces, a maritime task force, and an air element capable of carrying out 200 combat sorties per day. The force will be capable of undertaking the whole variety of the article 5 and non-article 5 operations within or beyond its traditional area of responsibility.²⁰⁵

Allied Command Operations (ACO) at SHAPE has the operational lead for the NRF. This includes standards, certification of the forces, as well as exercises. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) will adapt future capabilities, including emerging technologies, and develop the doctrine for the force. The NRF is formed within NATO’s

²⁰¹ NATO launches Response Force, AFNORTH HQ, Brunssum, 15 October 2003, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/10/i031015.htm>>, accessed 12 February 2004.

²⁰² The NATO Response Force – NRF, 12 February 2004, available at: <http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrf_intro.htm>, accessed 15 February 2004.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

Regional Headquarters under the overall command of SACEUR, with operational command delegated to the Regional Commanders. “The cycle is based on a period of unit and interoperability training, followed by a six-month ‘on-call’ period.”²⁰⁶

The Allied Forces North Europe (AFNORTH), at Brunssum, the Netherlands, took over the first prototype (NRF 1) on 15 October 2003. Allied Forces South Europe (AFSOUTH), in Naples, Italy, undertook the second one (NRF 2) on 15 January 2004 and a new Joint Force Headquarters (JFQ), in Lisbon, Portugal, will take over the third one (NRF 3), on 1 July 2004.

The missions for the NRF are yet to be determined, however, the global reach is an important element, especially today, as NATO forces are committed in Kabul, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean.²⁰⁷ In specific, its missions will include: collective defense obligations; crisis response (including peacekeeping); support counter terrorism operations; consequence management (including CBRN events and humanitarian crises); peace enforcement; embargo operations (maritime, initial land, and no-fly zone); initial entry force; demonstrative force package (quick response operations); and non-combatant evacuation.²⁰⁸

The NRF will also be a key catalyst for improving Alliance military capabilities. Moreover, all Allies see the NRF and the European Union’s Headline Goal Force as fully compatible and mutually reinforcing initiatives. In practice, the tasks of the NRF are likely to focus on those requiring the ability to react in a very short time. These might include deployment as a show of force and solidarity to deter aggression, a stand-alone force for Article 5 or non-Article 5 (crisis management, stabilization) operations, and deployment as an initial entry force for a larger force.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ NATO Defense Ministers Background Briefing, “NRF-NATO’s Expeditionary Capability,” Colorado Springs, 8-9 October 2003, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2003/10-colorado/briefing02.pdf>>, accessed 12 October 2003.

²⁰⁹ The NATO Response Force: At the center of NATO transformation,” available at: <<http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/index.htm>>, accessed 15 February 2004.

B. RETHINKING FUTURE ORIENTATION

The center of gravity for the last 50 years in the Alliance has been in Western Europe, but the center of activity is moving east. The geostrategic center of interest for the foreseeable future will be the Greater Middle East, a region that stretches from northern Africa to the Levant, from the Persian Gulf to Afghanistan. There is also an emerging concern to NATO's south because Africa is replete with ungoverned spaces for attracting terrorists, radical fundamentalism, WMD, and all kinds of criminality.²¹⁰

The Alliance must again together find a new purpose and a new grand strategy to meet a different set of challenges beyond its territory. Lord Robertson, a former NATO Secretary General said in Berlin in 2003 that the next stage in an effective security strategy would be to decide what to do about the threats. He quoted,

‘Outside our borders, within the framework of prevention and projection-action, we must be able to identify and prevent threats as soon as possible. Within this framework, possible pre-emptive action is not out of the question, where an explicit and confirmed threat has been recognised.’ Donald Rumsfeld or Colin Powell? Actually, the French Ministry of Defence in September 2002. Or what about this: ‘We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.’ Not Tommy Franks but the new EU strategy. And my final quote comes from Minister Struck’s own excellent Defence Policy Guidelines: ‘defence can no longer be narrowed down to geographical boundaries, but contributes to safeguarding our security wherever it is in jeopardy.’²¹¹

On the other hand, to fight threats with globalized character not only requires to operate beyond geographical boundaries, but also to prevent danger from happening inside the own territory. In addition, there is the contemplated idea of embracing new potential members (Sweden, Austria) to strengthen NATO’s collective security management. Furthermore, Ronald Asmus noted,

In an age when the greatest threats come from terrorists or rogue states armed with WMD, the new front line of defense must be transatlantic

²¹⁰ General James L. Jones, “Surrender Monkeys—Not: The NATO Supreme Commander Speaks Out,” 6 October 2003, *Newsweek*, p. 41

²¹¹ Lord Robertson, “The West after Iraq: Are the Security Strategies of the US and Europe still Compatible?” Speech of the NATO Secretary General in Berlin, 24 June 2003, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030624a.htm>>, accessed 17 November 2003.

homeland security. There are few areas in which the need for transatlantic cooperation is more self-evident or America's own interest in the EU's becoming a strong and coherent actor more obvious. In fact, it is precisely in this area that U.S.-European cooperation has continued largely undisturbed by the Iraq crisis. But much more needs to be done. The EU, for instance, needs to create its own Office of Homeland Security to expand cooperation in this area."²¹²

Another point deserves public consideration. In a globalized world information links all parts of the world almost immediately. Lord Robertson stated in this regard:

[W]e need to redouble efforts to bring the wider public along. One of the characteristics of this new security environment is that our security policies—and our institutions—are changing faster than the perceptions of our publics. As a result, the task of explaining what NATO is and what it is doing is becoming ever more demanding. We must therefore exercise additional effort to ensure that public understanding of the new NATO remains widespread, strong and supportive.²¹³

The need to devise a NATO global strategy encompasses a more equitable burden-sharing relationship with the allies. This is really the most important factor threatening the common success. For example, recent budget constraints in Europe were a major hurdle to improve European military capabilities significantly. Burden-sharing permanently remains “as an attempt by elites to avoid trade-offs between collective and national goals.”²¹⁴ Above all, elite nations saw the whole project as endangering their own capability to support their national foreign policy. Moreover, they might not trust other countries to provide the assigned capabilities when necessary. Those different perceptions and the urgent necessity for action, however, might render the making of relevant decisions even more difficult. Wallace Thies describes that elites

face three constraints: they must not sow pessimism about the alliance by doing too little and/or making demands that allies are unable to meet; they must not risk the next election by raising doubts about their competence;

²¹² Ronald D. Asmus, “Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2003, available at: <<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901faessay82502/ronald-d-asmus/rebuilding-the-atlantic-alliance.html>>, accessed 19 January 2004.

²¹³ Lord Robertson, “Transforming NATO,” NATO Review, Spring 2003, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue1/english/art1.html>>, accessed 22 October 2003.

²¹⁴ Wallace J. Thies, *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO*, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), p. 15.

and they must not alienate voters by openly sacrificing guns to buy butter.²¹⁵

In other words, burden-sharing is paramount in organizing collective security. In democratic societies, it is not immediately feasible, especially in still “unhomogenized” Europe. No wonder that the burden of the defense has fallen primarily upon the United States. Similarly, one of the constant U.S. complaints has always been that European allies do not spend much on defense. The problem of investing to balance the capability gap between the U.S. and Europe

is made by governments that are expected to shelter their citizenry from hardships of all sorts, chronically short of the resources needed to do all the things expected of them, hence alert to the possibilities for shifting some of their burdens to other NATO members, and indeed impelled to try hard to do so by the requirements of competing successfully in the next election. Since governments in all of the NATO countries are subject to these political and economic constraints, reaching agreement among them on how to share responsibility for the collective effort is essentially a bargaining problem.²¹⁶

Nicholas Burns, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO stated in this regard:

A NATO in which the U.S. has over 200 strategic lift aircraft, Britain four, and the rest of the allies none is unsustainable. A NATO in which the U.S. will spend \$376 billion on national defense this year and our 18 allies only spend \$140 billion collectively is unbalanced. A NATO in which the U.S., UK and France are alone capable of launching expeditionary military missions to distant battlefields is unworkable. As we all face a grave new threat to our societies from the toxic mix of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, we in NATO must all be prepared militarily to meet that threat. No amount of wishful thinking or promises will make the new NATO Response Force a reality. Our European allies must now begin to meet their commitments to address rapidly the alarming imbalances in airlift, precision-guided munitions, air-to-air refueling, sealift and secure communications.²¹⁷

The commitment of adequate resources is fundamental to improving capabilities. However, the defined threshold of 2% of GDP devoted to defense, as one of the criteria

²¹⁵ Ibid., p. 14.

²¹⁶ Ibid., p. 263.

²¹⁷ R. Nicholas Burns, “The New NATO: Healing the Rift,” U.S. Ambassador to NATO Remarks to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Brussels, 27 May 2003, available at: <<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/21241.htm>>, accessed 10 December 2003.

for joining the Alliance has not been met by several current member states. Additionally, the costly means when deciding what to do with outdated equipment and infrastructure that were so closely tied to member states' national economies has also become a great problem. Moreover, some countries while facing strict criteria to join EU were forced to cut expenditures on defense. On the other hand, many countries pledged to change their traditional attitude and make more lavish contributions after Prague.

More specifically, the French 2003-2008 Military Program Bill of Law refers to a policy of preemption against terrorist networks: "The improvement of long-range strike capabilities should constitute a deterrent threat for our potential aggressors, especially as transnational terrorist networks develop and organize outside our territory."²¹⁸ The bill provides for increases in spending on military equipment by nearly \$2 billion a year for the next six years. The overall French military budget for 2003 rose 6.1 percent over the previous year's budget.²¹⁹ The British responded to the new environment with the biggest sustained real increase in defense spending in 20 years. Britain's defense budget, already the largest in Europe, will increase by 1.2 percent annually until 2006.²²⁰ However, Germany's defense budget remains constantly low, partly because of the lowest GDP growth in recent years, making Germany Europe's worst-performing economy since 1993.²²¹ Thus, Britain and France together represent over 40 percent of all defense spending in Europe.

Another very important aspect is the American RMA. It has major implications for NATO, making it more effective in joint military operations. Since the United States has access to more intelligence in real time, and has more advanced military technology at its disposal, the United States is more or less considered as the peace enforcer, whereas Europe specializes in peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction. Washington made it clear that its armed forces were reluctant to do peace making and peace building.

²¹⁸ Ministry of Defense, Paris, 12 September 2002, For the 2003-2008 Military Program Bill of Law, available at: <<http://www.defense.gouv.fr>>.

²¹⁹ Keith B. Richburg, "In Shift, France Vows to Modernize Military 'Financial Effort' Now, Their Minister Says," *Washington Post*, 16 October 2002.

²²⁰ "£3.5 Billion Increase for British Defence—A Mandate for Modernisation," British Embassy, *Washington press release*, 15 July 2002.

²²¹ "Fears of New Recession in Germany," *The Financial Times*, 27 February 2003.

However, this convenient division of labor was certainly not politically accepted, since it might exacerbate the diverging strategic perspectives among allies.²²²

NATO's immediate future has five clear goals. The first goal is to reinforce NATO's long-term peacekeeping role in Afghanistan, as the stabilization of Afghanistan is NATO's priority task. If the political process fails, that country will again become a haven for terrorists. Extending the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will help spread stability beyond the capital of Kabul and assist the Karzai Government in its task of consolidating the country and strengthening its ownership of the political and economic recovery process.²²³ Therefore, Defense Ministers decided on February 6 to move out of the Kabul command post to build a nation-wide presence, starting with the PRT led by Germany in the northern city of Konduz. NATO is moving to create five PRTs in the next six months to bring stability to important provincial cities. NATO will take command of all PRTs and ultimately be in a position to take over responsibility for all military operations, including the U.S.-led coalition—as soon as security circumstances permit. To do that, European nations must contribute more troops and resources to buttress a longer and more vigorous NATO presence in the country.²²⁴

The second aim is to examine how NATO might take on a collective military role in Iraq, which will be a leading issue at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004. While the UN and other international aid agencies provide the economic and humanitarian assistance, NATO can offer security environment to give Iraqis the time and confidence to manage the transition to democracy. Third, NATO must expand its long-term engagement with Israel and the Moslem world to help those countries find their way toward a more peaceful future in the Greater Middle East. Secretary Powell suggested that NATO should transform the Mediterranean Dialogue into a true Partnership offering military training and exercises and a closer political relationship. The fourth goal is to improve

²²² Peter van Ham and Richard L. Kugler, "Western Unity and Transatlantic Security Challenge," *The Marshal Center Papers*, No. 4, 2002, pp.18.

²²³ NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Munich Security Conference, 7 February 2004, NATODOC, available at: <<http://listserv.cc.kuleuven.ac.be/cgi-bin/wa?A1=ind0402&L=natodata>>, accessed 10 February 2004.

²²⁴ Nicholas R. Burns, "NATO and the Future of Trans-Atlantic Relations," Remarks by U.S. NATO Ambassador at Wilton Park, Surrey, United Kingdom, 9 February 2004, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/usa/2004/u040209a.htm>>, accessed 15 February 2004.

relations between NATO and the EU as both differed in 2003 over Iraq, in theological disputes over Berlin Plus, the Balkans and EU defense plans. The fifth aim is to elevate NATO's relations with Russia. The constructive engagement with Russia, through the NATO-Russia Council needs to change from a good forum to a closer relationship.²²⁵

Just as the NATO role in Afghanistan grew from providing logistical and other kinds of support to the German and Dutch lead, it is certainly possible to imagine the Alliance role in Iraq evolving in a similar fashion in the future. With the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 encouraging the international community and regional organizations to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq, the door is wide open to more robust and active Alliance's involvement.²²⁶ Indeed, stabilizing post-war Iraq by NATO turns to be beneficial because the Allies on both sides of the Atlantic have much to lose if Iraq's nation-building effort goes awry.²²⁷

All in all, NATO in the future must be permanently able to develop new skills, techniques, and practices as follows: (1) design and employ military forces in significantly different ways from those of the past, (2) interact effectively with NGOs, (3) deal with the "paradox of information,"²²⁸ (4) revise methods of making and carrying out U.S. and European foreign policies (5) reconcile the competing demands of domestic special interests toward the outside world, (6) build international institutions, practices, processes, and relationships that can be sustained over time and that will engage a broad range of other countries in collaboration with the Alliance.²²⁹ Additionally, the Alliance must maintain a sound structure of Nuclear Forces because they will continue to fulfill an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ R. Nicholas Burns, "The New NATO: Healing the Rift," U.S. Ambassador to NATO Remarks to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Brussels, 27 May 2003, available at: <<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/21241.htm>>, accessed 10 December 2003.

²²⁷ Anouar Boukhars and Steve A. Yetiv, "9/11 and the Growing Euro-American Chasm over the Middle East," *European Security*, Vol.12, No.1 (Spring 2003), p. 65.

²²⁸ It is defined by: the more access to information, the greater challenge to the ability of governments to decide on national interests and to mobilize action.

²²⁹ Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost, *The Global Century: Globalization and National Security*, (NDU Press, 2001), Chapter 4, Robert E. Hunter, "Global Economics and Unsteady Regional Geopolitics," pp. 123-124.

Allies' response. Therefore, that uncertainty must maintain the option of the "first use."²³⁰

C. NATO'S GLOBAL ROLE

NATO evolved from a purely continental defensive alliance to an organization with a greater collective security role. Moreover, it has transitioned from a security alliance focused on the Euro-Atlantic region to an organization possessing the political will and military ability to operate on a global scale.

Lord Robertson, a former NATO Secretary General, stated: "Today, NATO is a problem solver. It must go where the trouble is. In today's world, if we don't go to the trouble, the trouble will come to you."²³¹

NATO has come a long way, not just in defining that new consensus, but in implementing it. From our anti-terrorist naval patrols in the Mediterranean to the stabilisation force in Afghanistan, from our Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism to measures to protect ourselves against chemical and biological attack. From slimming down our Command Structure to creating the new NATO Response Force and a brand new Supreme Allied Command to drive transformation, this Alliance has fully embraced the need to evolve and adapt in line with the new strategic environment.²³²

A number of arguments support the idea of widening the geographical horizon of the Atlantic alliance. Conflict can no longer be regionalized and technological progress tends to abolish geographical distance. In the year 2010, about 80 percent of NATO's territory will be in the range of ballistic missiles launched from the Near and Middle East or Northern Africa. The proliferation of missile technology significantly aggravates the danger of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and as events in India and Pakistan showed, the number of biological, chemical, or even nuclear players in world politics is rising. Hence NATO allies are likely to face future military threats from regions far

²³⁰ Margarita Mathiopoulos, "NATO Goes Global or Becomes Irrelevant," *Dr. Manfred Wörner Circle*, NATO HQ Brussels, 19 November 2001.

²³¹ NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, "*The Role of NATO in the 21st Century*," Speech at the Welt am Sonntag Forum, 3 November 2003, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s031103a.htm>>, accessed 10 February 2004.

²³² Ibid..

beyond the borders of traditional NATO defense planning. Moreover, vital challenges are not strictly limited to the military realm—a sudden cut in the supply of energy from the Gulf region or a disruption of trade routes from East Asia would undoubtedly be viewed as an essential threat to Europe.²³³ In the same vein, Nicholas Burns, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, noted:

NATO's past was focused inward, on Cold War threats directed at the heart of Europe. NATO's future is to look outward to the Greater Middle East to expand security in that arc of countries from South and Central Asia to the Middle East and North Africa—where the new challenges to global peace are rooted.²³⁴

Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious economic problems, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. Extending stability into this part of the world becomes crucial as dealing with the Greater Middle East. This area is full of rising anti-Western ideologies, terrorism, and proliferation of WMD. The regimes of this region are failing and their failures are helping to breed extremist ideologies.²³⁵ Indeed, it is from this region that the greatest danger to transatlantic societies is likely to originate.

A vast continent of Sub-Saharan Africa remains dominated by poverty, weak governments, unstable societies, and outdated economies. At present, globalization is mostly worsening Africa's plight. Africa needs outside economic help and assistance in handling the region's often-troubled security affairs.²³⁶

Surveying Asia, the age of globalization has many positive effects in triggering market reforms, greater democracy, and faster growth. Yet, the 1997 crisis exposed Asia's vulnerability to abrupt financial shocks and its need for further reforms. Moreover, globalization is having uneven effects, uplifting elites and coastal areas, but leaving the

²³³ Karl Heinz Kamp, "A Global Role for NATO?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1999, p. 9.

²³⁴ Nicholas R. Burns, "NATO and the Future of Trans-Atlantic Relations," Remarks by U.S. NATO Ambassador at Wilton Park, Surrey, United Kingdom, 9 February 2004, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/usa/2004/u040209a.htm>>, accessed 15 February 2004.

²³⁵ Ronald D. Asmus, "Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2003, available at: <<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901faessay82502/ronald-d-asmus/rebuilding-the-atlantic-alliance.html>>, accessed 19 January 2004.

²³⁶ Flanagan, p. 22.

masses and rural areas in trouble. Asia's economic progress depends on stable security politics, but major change is uncertain as China, Japan and other countries are all reevaluating their strategic priorities. The consequence may be greater instability if events are not handled properly. The bottom line is that NATO will face a future of strategic challenges and opportunities there.²³⁷ In this regard, Isabelle Cordonier and Bruno Tertrais noted:

For Westerners, Asia's stability is perhaps the major strategic stake at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The magnitude of Asia's growth and the increasing economic and financial interactions among European, American, and Asian markets forbid them to treat Asia as "just another continent." In the long-term, the development of strategic ties between Asia and the Middle East will have considerable consequences: in a henceforth more open geopolitical game, the zone running from the Mediterranean to the Bay of Bengal could become the meeting point of Western and Asian strategies. Scarcely forcing the sketch, two groups of countries tied by objective interests stand out: on the one hand, the United States-Turkey-Israel-India-Japan; and, on the other hand, China-Pakistan-Arabian peninsula.²³⁸

Hence, globalization's uneven dynamics are having very different regional consequences. Economics and security affairs are interacting as an engine of progress in some regions, but as a source of strain in others. International mechanisms and institutions for coping with the challenges of the global era remain asymmetrical. The lag in the development of new security structures calls for further strengthening of the instruments for regional cooperation and security. Alliances like NATO will remain a pervasive feature of international politics, even as they must adapt to changing circumstances. Illustrative is the success in Europe, where the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council allowed NATO countries to build a web of political and military cooperation.²³⁹

Nicholas R. Burns said:

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Isabelle Cordonnier and Bruno Tertrais, *L'Asie nucléaire*, (Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 2001), p. 167.

²³⁹ Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost, *The Global Century: Globalization and National Security*, (NDU Press, 2001), Chapter 1, Stephen J. Flanagan, "Meeting the Challenges of the Global Century," p. 22.

NATO remains today the world's most powerful and important alliance. It took 55 years for Europeans and North Americans to build this Alliance, which serves as our bridge across the Atlantic, our principal forum to work together and our mutual protection in a dangerous world. It is well worth preserving and advancing for all the challenges ahead of us.... to keeping NATO at the center of the great effort to build a democratic, peaceful and secure world in the years ahead.²⁴⁰

Granted, NATO has its own rationale and motive to exist in the 21st century. Similarly, Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler say that "A big organization without purpose eventually loses its legitimacy and will to live. After that a slow death is inevitable."²⁴¹ In fact, NATO's future depends on a clear political definition of its future tasks. These include the classic security function as an insurance against events going wrong, the function of consultation on political and military issues throughout the world, the development of arms control policies and the monitoring and verification of agreements, and the intra Alliance functions to serve as glue that sticks countries together. NATO's future further depends on a new balance of American and European defense responsibilities, a convincing explanation of the NATO's function as a safety net in a period of potential instability, a credible rationale as to why it continues to make sense to provide for security in a collective manner.²⁴²

Last but not least, the convergence between NATO and the United Nations in terms of security seems to be inevitable. NATO is no longer a regional security organization but collective security instrument acting in a global scope, so as the United Nations. Both organizations were "established to provide predictability and order in a world in constant flux and both organizations are the symbol of humanity's collective aspirations for a better life in a safer world for all."²⁴³ Whereas NATO adopted a

²⁴⁰ Nicholas R. Burns, "NATO and the Future of Trans-Atlantic Relations," Remarks by U.S. NATO Ambassador at Wilton Park, Surrey, United Kingdom, 9 February 2004, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/usa/2004/u040209a.htm>>, accessed 15 February 2004.

²⁴¹ Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, "Dual-Track Transformation for the Atlantic Alliance," *Defense Horizon*, November 2003, p. 2.

²⁴² Klaus Wittmann, "NATO's Future Military Strategy" in William D. Wharton, *Security Arrangements for a New Europe*, The Fourteenth NATO Symposium Spring 1991, (Washington, National Defense University Press, 1992), pp. 130 - 131.

²⁴³ Ramesh Thakur, "Reforming the United Nations: Changing with and for the Times," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 10, No.4, Winter 2003, p. 40.

complex rational transformation program, the United Nations remains complacent about the security consequences caused by globalization.

A NATO that can project power and purpose outside Europe will greatly enhance the odds of preserving world peace while advancing democratic values. The simple reality is that the United States cannot handle the global problems of the contemporary era alone, and neither can Europe nor the United Nations. Together, however, they can succeed. This is a main reason for keeping NATO alive and healthy, and for transforming it in the effective instrument with global reach. The challenge facing the Atlantic Alliance is to pursue these goals in an effective manner that the United States, Europe, and United Nations will support.²⁴⁴

²⁴⁴ Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, "Dual-Track Transformation for the Atlantic Alliance," *Defense Horizon*, November 2003, p. 4.

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VI. CONCLUSION

In just two years, NATO changed more than at any time in its history. In a major new initiative launched at the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO Allies agreed to acquire, over time, a range of new military capabilities necessary for the expeditionary missions far from Europe that are redefining the way allies plan and think about their national and collective defense. In summer 2003, NATO adopted a leaner and more flexible command structure, negotiated in record time. In December, NATO created a new Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Defense Battalion to protect NATO's populations in the event of an attack using weapons of mass destruction. And in the most important and decisive shift to a 21st century, NATO is building a NATO Response Force that will give NATO a powerful and quick capability to deploy its troops within days.²⁴⁵ This new virtue gives NATO the ability to act as the best international military framework in the world more quickly and decisively inside and outside of the transatlantic sphere than ever before in its history.

Those revolutionary changes on the military side of NATO are complemented by equally creative political changes. Seven Central European countries will join NATO in April 2004. This is the largest single enlargement since NATO's founding in 1949. The old Cold War truth was to worry that adding new countries would weaken the Alliance. The new truth is that enlargement strengthens NATO and extends its sphere of security eastward. Once the seven new members join the Alliance, forty percent of NATO will be formerly socialist countries. These new members will refresh the spirit of the Alliance and add real value militarily and politically to the NATO's collective strength.²⁴⁶

The emerging democratic peace in Europe is a major, historic achievement but a united Europe will only be sustained if NATO builds partnerships with those countries outside of NATO—especially Russia. The same is true of NATO's special relationship with Ukraine as it is a country of strategic importance. Additionally, a new strategic

²⁴⁵ Nicholas R. Burns, "NATO and the Future of Trans-Atlantic Relations," Remarks by U.S. NATO Ambassador at Wilton Park, Surrey, United Kingdom, 9 February 2004, available at: <<http://www.nato.int/usa/2004/u040209a.htm>>, accessed 15 February 2004.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

engagement to the Central Asia and the Caucasus is so critical to NATO's efforts in Afghanistan. These initiatives will certainly be a focus for Partnership for Peace in the years ahead. Thus, the substantial changes in NATO's military mission, membership and partnerships have positioned NATO for another ambitious future.²⁴⁷

However, the age of globalization requires both the emergence of effective international structures (like NATO) and the paralysis of the nation-state functions. As a matter of fact, sustainable globalization requires a stable power structure. The global environmental and security change and its subsequent social and economic effects are likely to continue and intensify in the future. The intensity will affect the development of international system with its elements—nation-states. Therefore, these challenges call for mutual cooperation at the international level, which provides for complex interconnection of environmental, political, military, economic, legal and social aspects. The central objective of foreign and security policy should be to shape the emerging world order in ways that protect interests and common values.

The answer to the question of the new world order must be given top priority in the transatlantic relationship. In political terms, a comprehensive issue of security must lead to a reorganization of the international system of states. It must lead to a new world order in which six billion people, more than 190 states and all the many religions and cultures can live altogether relatively peacefully. It also entails the creation of a fair world trade system, answers to climate change and preservation of the global environment, the fight against poverty and AIDS, support of human rights and continued development of international law and its institutions. For that, Joschka Fischer says “we need more than strong democracies based on a stable foundation of values. We also need strong multilateral institutions—first and foremost a reformed UN.”²⁴⁸

The United Nations remains the indispensable center for harmonizing the separate national interests into a common set of global policies and international actions. UN is not only the international symbol, but mainly the institutional means of bringing about

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Joschka Fischer, “Europe and the Future of the Transatlantic Relations,” Speech by German Foreign Minister at Princeton University, 19 November 2003, Council on Foreign Relations, available at: <http://www.cfr.org/reg_index.php?id=5||1>, accessed 11 January 2004.

such a better future for all of humanity. Its structures and processes should be a principal for attaining humanity's collective goals.²⁴⁹ Therefore, an appropriate strategy for the period immediately ahead would be reliance on the United Nations system, under appropriate circumstances, for peacekeeping and crisis management actions requiring the material support of Western governments.²⁵⁰

The United Nations currently deploys more than 45,000 peacekeepers, but their effectiveness is severely limited because they are supposed to enforce existing peace accords and stay strictly neutral even if one party is clearly at fault. This does nothing to help in places like Rwanda and Haiti, where there is no peace to enforce. The idea of creating a more robust U.N. force capable of smiting aggressors has been around since the late 1940s. It got a brief burst of life in the early 1990s after the Cold War, but it was entombed after the U.N. was blamed for failures in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia.²⁵¹

It's time to resurrect the idea of a standing UN army, as a supplement, if not replacement, for the other forces mentioned above. The key to making it work would be eschewing the old UN way of conducting business, which consists of asking for military contributions from a lot of countries with minimal capabilities, no record of working together and differing strategic interests. The UN needs a tough, professional force like the NATO Response Force or the French Foreign Legion that would not quail before Haitian gang leaders or Serbian ethnic-cleavers.²⁵² It seems that NATO after acquiring an agile, flexible, and credible NRF with a global reach will be a proper instrument to fit into this requirement.

Above all, a new world order must be based on effective multilateralism, which is able to impose peace and security. This effective multilateralism requires both the U.S., as a world power, and the UN, as a framework institution because the UN is the only international organization with the resource of global legitimacy. Therefore, the UN must

²⁴⁹ Ramesh Thakur, "Reforming the United Nations: Changing with and for the Times," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 10, No.4, Winter 2003, p. 60.

²⁵⁰ William H. Lewis, "NATO and Out-of-Area Concerns: A Different Paradigm" in William D. Wharton, *Security Arrangements for a New Europe*, The Fourteenth NATO Symposium Spring 1991, (Washington, National Defense University Press, 1992), p. 95.

²⁵¹ Max Boot, "Shouldering the Load, And The Rifle Failed States Need New U.S. Activism and a U.N. Army," *Los Angeles Times*, 26 February 2004.

²⁵² Ibid.

exert its authority on the international scene. Otherwise, the U.S. and EU, respectively NATO, may be less inclined to use UN to resolve the world crises in the future. A radical reform of the United Nations, calling for stronger action against weapons of mass destruction, swifter intervention in humanitarian crises and an overhaul of bureaucracy is desperately needed. A wide reform is necessary if the United Nations is to remain the main forum for collective international action. The UN is at risk of failing in its role unless it evolves to tackle the threat posed by international terrorism and failing states.²⁵³

Finally, the globalized world of the 21st century will not be a homogenous place. The global era demands new approaches to managing change and containing crises. While stability in the Cold War required the maintenance of deterrence and preservation of the political status quo, stability in the global era means peaceful adaptation to change. Globalization has changed the way people see and understand security matters and the military. Charles Moskos says, “No social institution is more affected by both national and international factors than the military.”²⁵⁴ Therefore, the military must adapt to a new environment and stay one step ahead: successful strategies and policies in the global era require much closer coordination as challenges in civil-military relations in the contemporary world are central to all democratic states. The promotion of global norms and institutions for managing change and conflict will be an important element of an effective strategy. NATO’s burden to deal with security is an inevitable element to make globalization less unpredictable. Then, NATO will surely survive even if UN and other international organization become the more important platform for settling disputes.

Vaclav Havel, a former President of the Czech Republic, insisted that the West should retain a normative identity, “a metaphysically anchored sense of responsibility.” But the metaphysics of the Alliance could be the doctrine of international community. NATO’s task should be to rededicate itself permanently and gradually to a different project, to admit that there were values which transcended the West, to find what it had in

²⁵³ Christopher Adams, “UN ‘Must Evolve’ to Tackle Terror Threat,” 2 February 2004, available at: <<http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1073281487090&p=1012571727159>>.

²⁵⁴ Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David. R. Segal, *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 265.

common with other cultures and “join forces with them in search for a common moral minimum.”²⁵⁵

In the end, America and Europe through NATO can master the challenges of the 21st century, but only if they act together. In doing so, three fundamental elements must be taken into consideration. The first element is the unconditional commitment of the Western democracies to their own fundamental values—freedom, human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the free market economy. The second element is the commitment to and respect for an international order based on shared values, the law, consent, cooperation and participation. The third element is the political determination and military strength to avert new dangers. Both components are necessary to destroy all totalitarian networks and ideologies built on hatred. The road to success for the Western democracies should lie in combining these three elements, which determine effective multilateralism. These principles should guide both sides of the Atlantic in making the joint contribution towards a peaceful, just and democratic world order.²⁵⁶ It is a shared interest, a shared burden, and a shared responsibility.

²⁵⁵ Vaclav Havel, “The Hope for Europe,” address in Aachen, 15 May 1996, reprinted in *New York Review of Books*, 20 June 1996, p. 38.

²⁵⁶ Joschka Fischer, “Europe and the Future of the Transatlantic Relations,” Speech by German Foreign Minister at Princeton University, 19 November 2003, Council on Foreign Relations, available at: <http://www.cfr.org/reg_index.php?id=5|||1>, accessed 11 January 2004.

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